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TRANSCENDENT HOMOSEXUALS AND DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDERS: 
SEXUAL HARM AND FREEDOM IN THE JUDICIAL IMAGINARY 
JOSEPH J. FISCHEL* 
ABSTRACT 
Among much of the American political and cultural left is the widespread sense 
that, despite temporary setbacks and isolated obstacles, the trajectory for sexual 
politics—which has come to be synonymous with the achievement of same-sex 
marriage—is inevitably coursed for success.  Whether through the slower, deliberative 
process of state-by-state legislation and/or through the reasoning of particularly 
enlightened judges, sexual justice will be formally accomplished. Lawrence v. Texas 
functions as a watershed, authorizing moment of this narrative. 
I assert in this Article that the national story of growing acceptance and 
appreciation for sexual pluralism is an incomplete one, and that a more dimensional 
view suggests that a refueled anxiety about sex offenders, as well as recent enactment 
and enforcement of sex offender registration and notification laws, operate to redraw 
lines of sexual normality, and to reassuringly but falsely isolate sexual harm within a 
legally constructed category of persons.  By comparing the changes in rhetoric and 
judicial argument from Bowers v. Hardwick to Lawrence v. Texas against the rhetoric 
and argument of the 2003 sex offender Supreme Court cases, Smith v. Doe and 
Connecticut Dept. of Public Safety v. Doe, I claim that the “sex offender” has been 
juridically codified as the exhaustive figure of sexual amorality and dangerousness, a 
position vacated by the once homophobic but now more dignified juridical construction 
of the homosexual.  Constructed as such, the constitutional claims of sex offenders are 
easily dismissed, and the Court helps produce the understandings of sexual personae and 
sexual harm it claims merely to report on.  Part I broadly canvasses the reemergence of 
sex offender registration and notification laws to give socio-legal context.  Part II 
outlines the constitutional claims of the John Does and the Court’s rejection of those 
claims in Smith and Connecticut.  Part III more closely examines how, rhetorically and 
jurisprudentially, the Court neutralizes the Does’ claims, and Part IV attempts to 
suggest why. 
 
*PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science and Hormel Fellow, Center for Gender Studies, at 
The University of Chicago.  I would like to thank Bernard Harcourt, Gerald Rosenberg, Patchen 
Markell, and Lauren Berlant, as well as the generous faculty and staff at the Center for Gender 
Studies at the University of Chicago.  All shortcomings and polemics are my own. 
Fischel_paginated.doc 7/2/2010  2:54:31 PM 
278 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 17:277 2010 
 
INTRODUCTION 
“[The Framers and the drafters of the 14th Amendment] knew times can blind us 
to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary 
and proper in fact serve only to oppress.”1 
“The sexual fringe is a scary place.”2 
For John Lawrence and Tyrone Garner, iconic figures for gays nationwide, 
June 2003 was nothing less than world transformative.  The Supreme Court 
declared sodomy laws unconstitutional, and granted previously withheld 
privacy and liberty protections to gays, lesbians, and their intimate (consensual, 
private, unpaid for) decisions.3  Lawrence is a landmark decision for the gay 
rights movement, as well as a landmark decision for the purchasing power of 
the 14th Amendment.  “When the history of our times is written, Lawrence may 
well be remembered as the Brown v. Board of gay and lesbian America.”4 
That is some pretty emancipatory stuff.5 
 
 1. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003). 
 2. Gayle Rubin, Sexual Politics, the New Right, and the Sexual Fringe, in THE AGE TABOO: GAY 
MALE SEXUALITY, POWER AND CONSENT 108, 115 (Daniel Tsang ed., 1981). 
 3. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 4. Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1895 (2004). 
 5. Of course, not everyone agrees that the promised freedoms and constitutional guarantees of 
Lawrence are purely emancipatory.  Katherine Franke contends that Lawrence “domesticates” the 
concept of liberty itself, affording liberty only as a privatized right to those who mimic heterosexual, 
bourgeois sexual practices and lifestyles, and only at the expense of a re-sanitized, re-regulated 
public sphere that no longer defends a more capacious understanding of sexual pluralism and 
sexual freedom.  Likewise, she proposes that the mostly uncritical and warm reception of Lawrence 
by the mainstream gay and lesbian rights movement signals a miniaturizing of the movement’s 
earlier postwar and post-Stonewall political aims.  See Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty 
of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1414, 1418 (2004) (“I fear that Lawrence and the gay 
rights organizing that has taken place in and around it have created a path dependency that 
privileges privatized and domesticated rights and legal liabilities, while rendering less viable 
projects that advance nonnormative notions of kinship, intimacy, and sexuality … How has this 
become a community that privileges recognition so highly, and seems to have abandoned some of 
the more radical strategies and goals grounded in a politics that sought to destabilize dominant 
forms of sexuality and kinship, rather than seeking to be stabilized by them?”). Similarly, Mary 
Anne Case suggests the liberty in Lawrence distills down to a right of gays and lesbians not to face 
criminal sanctions for their homebound sex, scaling back any potential the ruling offered to promote 
sexual equality.  See Mary Anne Case, Of “This” and “That” in Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 
75, 80, 96–97 (2003).  Jasbir Puar argues that the protected intimacy of the private gay couple found 
in Lawrence is made intelligible and valuable through the “reracialization of sodomy elsewhere.”  See 
JASBIR K. PUAR, TERRORIST ASSEMBLAGES: HOMONATIONALISM IN QUEER TIMES, 84, 120 (2007).  The 
cultural and media-inflected sexualizing of Arabs and Muslims after September 11th (from Abu 
Ghraib to news cartoons) as well as the legal withdrawal of intimacy and privacy rights to indefinite 
detainees authorized the “national queer liberal subject before the law” as white and worthy of 
judicial safeguards.  Id.  Bernard Harcourt warns that decriminalization of sodomy might serve to 
deradicalize queer activism, which hinges in part on the power of transgression.  See Bernard E. 
Harcourt, “You are Entering a Gay and Lesbian Free Zone”: On the Radical Dissents of Justice Scalia and 
Other (Post-) Queers, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 503, 512 (2004)(“There may be more to be gained 
from resisting a criminal stigma where—or so long as, or on the condition that—criminal 
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Things did not bode so well in March of that same year for John Doe, John 
Doe, John Doe, and Jane Doe, three sex offenders and the wife of one, 
respectively and pseudonymously.  The Supreme Court handed down twin 
decisions, Smith. v. Doe and Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 
rebuffing all of the Does’ claims seeking constitutional protections from state sex 
offender registration and notification requirements.6  If the 2003 spring/summer 
Court session ushered in the promise of juridical freedom for one historical 
sexual outcast, the homosexual, it codified another sexual outcast, the sex 
offender, and declared open season on him. 
Since the specter of the pedophile is and has been historically deployed to 
criminalize gays (see J. Edgar Hoover),7 retract their rights (see Anita Bryant and 
the “Save Our Children” campaign),8 or neutralize their political aspirations (see 
Prop 8),9 it may seem particularly cruel and politically naive—if not 
dangerous—to consider the setbacks faced by the John Does against the 
successes achieved by John Lawrence and Tyrone Garner, and to ask what 
rhetorical, discursive, political, juridical connections there are, if any, between 
these cases.  Yet the formal similarities of the cases are evident and invite 
comparison: Lawrence and the sex offender cases involved regulating 
marginalized sexual personae, adjudicating the limit of law’s reach in citizens’ 
lives, delimiting the liberty afforded by due process protections, and discerning 
the proper figuration of harm and morality in lawmaking around sex.  
Moreover, if, Lawrence and the sexual moral imaginary it animates and stokes 
require creating, disavowing, and then demonizing a sexual subclass, then 
theorizing the 2003 cases in tandem is neither cruel nor naive, but necessary in 
diagnosing and interrogating how understandings of sexual freedom and sexual 
harm are currently, juridically inscribed.  More clearly, the thesis of this article is 
this: Lawrence argues that sex between consenting adults in private is 
constitutionally protected.10  The fault line between the sexually acceptable and 
the sexually abject, between the terrain of progressive sexual politics and the 
terrain of sexual perversion, is brokered by the apparently transparent figure of 
the consenting adult.  The presumption of Lawrence is that sexual harm is present 
 
enforcement and accompanying punishments are in fact de minimis, than there is to be lost in the 
normalization of conventional deviance”). The corollary to these objections might be that while 
Lawrence is not purely emancipatory—emancipation is never pure—the best one can hope for is 
minimizing the costs rather than eliminating them. 
 6. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003); Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003). 
 7. See generally George Chauncey, Jr., The Postwar Sex Crime Panic, in TRUE STORIES FROM THE 
AMERICAN PAST 160 (William Graebner ed., 1993). 
 8. See Patrick McCreery, Beyond Gay: “Deviant” Sex and the Politics of the ENDA Workplace, in 
OUT AT WORK: BUILDING A GAY-LABOR ALLIANCE 31, 35–37 (Kitty Krupat & Patrick McCreery eds., 
2001). 
 9. Supporters of Proposition 8, the 2008 anti-gay marriage referendum in California, 
successfully made the protection of children the central topic of debate in a referendum on the 
statutory recognition of and distribution of benefits to adult citizens. The “Yes on 8” advertisements 
are available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0PgjcgqFYP4 and http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=l61Pd5_jHQw. Many of the testimonials, ads, and information on the Yes on 8 site 
reference public schools, teaching children about gay marriage, and parents’ efforts to shield their 
children from gay teachers and gay curricula. See ProtectMarriage.com, http:// 
www.protectmarriage.com (last visited Apr. 6, 2010). 
 10. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
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only where the consenting adult is absent, or at least the kind of harm with which a 
liberal non-interfering state ought to interfere.11  But because “consenting adult” 
cannot capture sexual ethics as cleanly or completely as the Court or the nation 
would like—that is, on the one hand, because a whole lot of sex is still harmful 
that involves legally consenting adults,12 and, on the other, not all sex among 
minors or between minors and adults is necessarily harmful13—the figure of the 
sex offender, remade and marked in Smith and Connecticut, contains the 
ambiguities of adult consent that threaten its coherence as a normative compass 
in the labyrinthine universe of sex and law.  The sex offender, and what the 
Court and the nation does with and to him, keeps alive, which is to say 
immunizes, adult consent as the story, the bright line, of sexual ethics, 
transmuting any fragility, ambiguity, loose ends, or displaced and disavowed 
erotic desire (for the child, or for riskiness) into violent reprisal.14  The sexual 
pluralism in Lawrence, acerbically recognized by Justice Scalia,15 registers on 
 
 11. Id. at 564, 578. 
 12. On forms of coercive sex that escapes the ambit of criminal rape law, see, inter alia, 
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 171–83 (1989); CATHARINE A. 
MACKINNON, WOMEN’S LIVES, MEN’S LAWS 240–48 (2005); Latoya Peterson, The Not-Rape Epidemic, in 
YES MEANS YES! VISIONS OF FEMALE SEXUAL POWER & A WORLD WITHOUT RAPE 209, 209–19 (Jaclyn 
Friedman & Jessica Valenti eds., 2008); STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF 
INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW 1-16 (1998). 
 13. See, inter alia, THE AGE TABOO: GAY MALE SEXUALITY, POWER AND CONSENT 17-18, 46-48,  
(Daniel Tsang ed., 1981); JUDITH LEVINE, HARMFUL TO MINORS: THE PERILS OF PROTECTING CHILDREN 
FROM SEX 68–89 (2002); MATTHEW WAITES, THE AGE OF CONSENT: YOUNG PEOPLE, SEXUALITY AND 
CITIZENSHIP 26-28 (2005); Bruce Rind & Philip Tromovitch, A Meta-Analytic Review of Findings from 
National Samples on Psychological Correlates of Child Sexual Abuse, 34 J. SEX RES. 237 (1997); Bruce Rind, 
Gay and Bisexual Adolescent Boys’ Sexual Experiences With Men: An Empirical Examination of 
Psychological Correlates in a Nonclinical Sample, 30 ARCHIVES OF SEX BEHAV. 345 (2001); Jessica L. 
Stanley, Kim Bartholomew, & Doug Oram, Gay and Bisexual Men’s Age Discrepant Childhood Sexual 
Experiences, 41 J. SEX RES. 381 (2004). 
 14. On the collective anxieties and latent desires that animate the violent police, legal, and social 
response to sex offenders, see Steven Bruhm and Natasha Hurley, Curiouser: On the Queerness of 
Children, in CURIOUSER: ON THE QUEERNESS OF CHILDREN ix, xxi–xxx (Steven Bruhm & Natasha 
Hurley eds., 2004); JAMES R. KINCAID, EROTIC INNOCENCE: THE CULTURE OF CHILD MOLESTING 74–109 
(1998); LAURA KIPNIS, BOUND AND GAGGED: PORNOGRAPHY AND THE POLITICS OF FANTASY IN 
AMERICA 3–63 (Duke Univ. Press 1999) (1996); LEVINE, supra note 13, at 20–44.  On the ways in which 
the imagined vulnerability and always threatened innocence of the child has infused the political 
and sexual practices and self-understandings of adults in the United States, see  Lauren Berlant, Live 
Sex Acts, 21 FEM. STUD. 379, 381 (1995) (“The little girl stands … as a condensation of many 
citizenship fantasies. It is in her name as future citizen that state and federal governments have long 
policed morality around sex and other transgressive representations.”). 
 15. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“State laws against bigamy, same-sex 
marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are 
likewise sustainable only in light of Bowers’ validation of laws based on moral choices. Every single 
one of these laws is called into question by today’s decision.”).  Scalia is, in fact, right.  The Lawrence 
opinion maintains that sexual regulatory laws are permissible only to the extent that they stop harm 
rather than enforce morality, without any cognizance that what counts as harm is animated by moral 
understanding and deliberation.  By running roughshod over the array of ethical questions raised by 
sexual practices that are not reducible to the presence or absence of consent, which the Lawrence 
opinion takes to be as the metric of sexual harm—questions about gender hierarchy, dependency, 
and family sexual abuse, for example—it, as well as the Smith and Connecticut rulings, smuggles the 
law’s and the court’s sexual moralism as an apparently non-moral concern with harm prevention.  
By pinning the “sex offender” as the purveyor of sexual harm, the Court both disavows its own 
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both judicial and national fronts.  Americans, social-justice loving people, and 
the legal system have entered (and created) an era where our conventional 
moral arguments and political capacity to identify and mitigate sexual harm are 
unraveling.  The legislative-turned-judicial understanding of, and punitive, 
mostly uncritical response to, the sex offender,16 comfortingly, and wrongly, 
relocates the danger of sexual harm onto a discrete body (the stranger, the 
pathological recidivist).  The figure reassuringly (re)partitions the moral 
universe on Manichean lines.  The legislative-turned-judicial maneuver glosses 
over the complexities of sexual harm and danger, and detracts from the primary 
sources of sexual abuse: fathers, family members, and family acquaintances.17  
Put slightly differently, while scholars have argued that “sex offenders” ought to 
be treated with greater restraint, nuance, and fairness,18 my argument 
 
sexual morality and shields its moral investments and distinctions as decidedly not moral, but rather 
neutral and Millian.  To hedge against the tidal wave of legally-sanctioned sexual pluralism 
prophesied by Scalia, the Lawrence, Smith, and Connecticut opinions collapse questions of morality 
into questions of harm (the absence of consent) as a way to narrow the more capacious sexual field it 
has helped inaugurate.  Parts III and IV, infra, extend and elaborate upon this argument.  See 
generally Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109 
(1999).  Mary Anne Case argues that, despite Scalia’s apocalyptic fears (and progressives’ hopes), 
Lawrence spatially and conceptually contains protected sexual freedom far more than it extends it.  
I’m not sure the argument of this Article conflicts with hers: as a matter of law, the reach of Lawrence 
may be short and yet to be fully-determined.  Symbolically, however, the juridical promise to 
safeguard adult consensual sex, and the juridical dignification of the homosexual, are politically and 
morally vast, and it is to this symbolic transformation which I believe Scalia’s dissent, the majority 
opinion, and the Smith and Connecticut decisions respond.  See Case, supra note 5, at 79.  On both the 
capaciousness and constraints of substantive privacy protections enunciated in Lawrence, see 
Marybeth Herald, A Bedroom of One’s Own: Morality and Sexual Privacy After Lawrence v. Texas, 16 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 29–32 (2004). 
 16. For comprehensive accounts on the historical emergence of “sexual pathology” as a 
conceptual category, the medicalization of sexual deviance, the influence of psychiatry on the 
legislative response to sex crimes and sex criminals, and the three waves of “sexual psychopath” and 
sex offender laws enacted in the United States (the late 1930s, the postwar era, and the 1990s–
present), see Deborah W. Denno, Life Before the Modern Sex Offender Statutes, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1317 
(1998); PHILIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD MOLESTER IN MODERN 
AMERICA 49, 189 (1998). 
 17. AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, UNDERSTANDING CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: EDUCATION, PREVENTION, AND 
RECOVERY (2001), available at http://www.apa.org/pubs/info/brochures/sex-abuse.aspx; HUM. RTS. 
WATCH, NO EASY ANSWERS: SEX OFFENDER LAWS IN THE U.S. (2007), available at http:// 
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0907webwcover.pdf; HOWARD N. SNYDER, DEP’T OF 
JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., SEXUAL ASSAULT OF YOUNG CHILDREN AS REPORTED TO LAW 
ENFORCEMENT: VICTIM, INCIDENT, AND OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS 10 (2000). Rose Corrigan argues 
that sex offender laws frame sexual violence as a pathological problem that inheres in predatory 
persons, undermining feminist attention to sexual violence as a common, persistent, and often 
sanctioned feature of everyday life and sexual relations. See Rose Corrigan, Making Meaning of 
Megan’s Law, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 267 (2006) See also ERIC S. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT: 
AMERICA’S SEXUAL PREDATOR LAWS AND THE RISE OF THE PREVENTIVE STATE 88 (2006)(“By focusing 
intensely on rare but horrific crimes, the predator laws convey a clear message that the feminists—
and the solid empirical science—are wrong . . . .  Rather, these laws tell us that the real sex criminals 
are those who lurk in the bushes and parking lots.”). 
 18. See generally Sarah E. Agudo, Comment, Irregular Passion: The Unconstitutionality and 
Inefficacy of Sex Offender Residency Laws, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 307 (2008); Ryan A. Boland, Note, Sex 
Offender Registration and Community Notification: Protection, Not Punishment, 30 NEW ENG. L. REV. 183 
(1995); Carol L. Kunz, Comment, Toward Dispassionate, Effective Control of Sexual Offenders, 47 AM. U. 
L. REV. 453 (1997); Note, Prevention Versus Punishment: Toward a Principled Distinction in the Restraint 
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presupposes (and contends) instead that the “sex offender” does not exist;19 or 
rather, that the figure of the sex offender has been legally created and codified, 
in part judicially, and that such creation and codification distinguishes sexual 
harm from sexual freedom, and sexual deviants from intimacy-valuing citizens, 
clearly and discretely, incorrectly and detrimentally.  The legislative attack on 
the “sex offender,” and the judicial affirmation of this attack—both in its 
rhetorical and doctrinal dimensions—skew our understanding of sexual harm 
onto and into one person, thus simplifying the world and its multiply sourced 
dangers.  In the following pages, I suggest that the amplified legislative and 
judicial anxiety around sex offenders is contemporaneous with the judicial 
emancipation (or at least decriminalization)—and the changing social mores that 
underwrite that emancipation—of the homosexual.  While the Lawrence opinion 
offers freedom and protection to the intimate, private homosexual, it 
nevertheless retains a structural logic that imagines and then attributes sexual 
harm and dangerousness onto one body, a character type, a sex offender.  Even 
though the characters changed, the script remained intact. 
Part I tracks the emergence of sex offender laws and the variety of forms 
they take from the 1990s to the present, and catalogues some common criticisms 
of them.  This section analyzes notification and registration broadly as a national 
diffusion, rather than discusses the statutes of the Smith and Connecticut 
jurisdictions (Alaska and Connecticut, respectively), 20 to situate these cases, 
their constitutional questions, and their cultural ramifications in a national 
context.  Indeed, Part I is skeletal, providing the institutional parameters to the 
argument of the Article.  Part II explicates the twin sex offender cases, focusing 
on the constitutional claims of the respondents and the arguments invoked by 
the Justices against them.  Part III reads the arguments of Smith and Connecticut 
against Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence.  The sort of juridical reasoning 
and rhetorical maneuvers of Bowers v. Hardwick (holding sodomy laws 
 
of Released Sex Offenders, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1711 (1996); Note, Making Outcasts Out of Outlaws: The 
Unconstitutionality of Sex Offender Registration and Criminal Alien Detention, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2731 
(2004). 
 19. On the medical and juridical construction of sexual subjects—and the consolidation of 
discrete sexual acts into comprehensive identities—see MICHEL FOUCAULT, 1 THE HISTORY OF 
SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION (1978).  Foucault’s most popularized contribution is that the 
“homosexual” is a modern production of multiple discourses rather than a stable figure throughout 
history.  Id. at 43.  As Foucault himself observed, the argument extends to all sexual subjects, from 
the heterosexual to the sex offender.  See also JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE 
SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 2 (1990) (“Juridical notions of power appear to regulate political life in 
purely negative terms—that is, through the limitation, prohibition, regulation . . . of individuals . . . 
But the subjects regulated by such structures are, by virtue of being subjected to them, formed, 
defined, and reproduced in accordance with the requirements of those structures.”) 
Some sociologists, lawyers, and psychiatrists objected to the rise of “sexual psychopath” laws in the 
late 1940s and early 1950s, suggesting that the term itself was vacuous and that singling out sex 
offenses for separate criminal law treatment would have adverse consequences.  See Edwin H. 
Sutherland, The Diffusion of Sexual Psychopath Laws, 56 AM. J. SOC. 142, 142 (1950) (“[T]he concept of 
the ‘sexual psychopath’ is so vague that it cannot be used for judicial and administrative purposes 
without the danger that the law may injure the society more than do the sex crimes which it is 
designed to correct.”). 
 20. Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act, 1994 Ala. Sess. Laws ch. 41 § 12(a); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 54-251 (West 2009). 
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constitutional)21 that Lawrence so heavily criticizes and rejects is strikingly 
parallel to the juridical reasoning of the Smith and Connecticut cases.  At the 
same historical moment – spring/summer 2003 – the Court (via Justice 
Kennedy) rejects certain forms of argumentation in the sphere of sexuality, 
morality, and the law; it then redeploys these strategies against sex offenders.  
Part IV asks and begins to answer: why?  Why does the Court shift its Bowers 
strategies over to Smith and Connecticut?  What can theorizing these cases 
together tell us about the juridical construction of sexual harm and sexual 
freedom, and about the national-liberal fantasy of adult consent as simply and 
summarily morally determinative in the terrain of sexuality? 
PART I: THE REEMERGENCE OF U.S. SEX OFFENDER LAWS 
“Moral panic” rapidly escalates around social and sexual deviancy in 
moments of political expediency and social dislocation.22  At various times in 
American history, the supposed sexual threat embodied in and by Jewish men, 
black men, gay men, and “sex psychopaths” has been hyperbolized by media, 
political elites, mental health professionals, and social conservatives to regulate 
the sexuality of newly urbanized girls;23 to re-sanctify the heterosexual nuclear 
family and restitute gender norms in the postwar period;24 to crack down on 
gays, gay bars, and gay public spaces;25 to stifle or superimpose the sexuality of 
children;26 to win votes; to make a profit; and even to cut welfare.27  It is beyond 
the scope of this Article to historicize changing sex offender laws or the varied 
social interpretations and legal constructions of the sex offender since the turn of 
the 20th century (as feeble-minded, as pathetic, as treatable, as evil, depending 
on the decade).28  I gesture at this history simply to note that the most recent 
 
 21. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 22. See generally STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS (1972); STUART HALL, ET AL., 
POLICING THE CRISIS: MUGGING, THE STATE AND LAW AND ORDER (1978); JENKINS, supra note 16; 
SIMON WATNEY, POLICING DESIRE: PORNOGRAPHY, AIDS AND THE MEDIA (1987). However, Denno 
challenges whether “panic” is the best descriptive category to explain enactment of “sexual 
psychopath,” and sex offender laws.  She argues that “moral panic” literature does not empirically 
ground the assertion that sensationalist media accounts and public fear are the primary explanatory 
variables for sex crime legislation.  See Denno, supra note 16, at 1355–68. 
 23. See CAROLYN E. COCCA, JAILBAIT: THE POLITICS OF STATUTORY RAPE LAWS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 12–14 (2004). 
 24. See Chauncey, supra note 7, at 166-71; Denno, supra note 16, at 1368–73; Estelle B. Freedman, 
“Uncontrolled Desires”: The Response to the Sexual Psychopath, 1920-1960, 74 J. AM. HIST. 83, 96–98 
(1987); JENKINS, supra note 16, at 71–72. 
 25. See PAT CALIFIA, PUBLIC SEX: THE CULTURE OF RADICAL SEX 54–97 (2000); Chauncey, supra 
note 7; Freedman, supra note 24, at 103–04. 
 26. See generally Steven Angelides, Feminism, Child Sexual Abuse, and the Erasure of Child 
Sexuality, 10 GLQ: J. LESBIAN & GAY STUD. 141 (2004); KINCAID, supra note 14, at 9452–72 ., 101 (“ The 
pedophile is something more than a scapegoat for us; it does more than siphon off and bottle dark 
desires and fears the culture cannot otherwise contain. Our pedophile handles those chores, 
certainly, but not so well that these desires and fears are expelled … One reflex of our obsessive 
focus on protection is to saturate children with a sexual discourse that inevitably links children, 
sexuality, and erotic appeal.”). 
 27. See Carolyn E. Cocca, From “Welfare Queen” to “Exploited Teen”: Welfare Dependency, Statutory 
Rape, and Moral Panic, 14 NAT. WOMEN’S STUD. ASS’N J. 56 (2002). 
 28. See generally JENKINS, supra note 16. 
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panics around child sexual abuse and sex offenders inaugurated in the 1980s 
and continue into the present, and the laws these panics motivate have a 
genealogy and historical antecedents.  The important point is that there is a 
constructivist story to be told, and neither sex panics, nor the laws that flow 
from them, necessarily correlate to documented increases in sexual violence or 
sexual abuse against children.29  Moral panics and their resultant laws are often 
about something other than, or in addition to, child protection. 
From the mid-1990s to the present, the United States has witnessed a tidal 
wave of state and federal sex offender laws.30  There are currently three31 main 
varieties of sex offender laws, all of which come into effect immediately prior to 
or upon the offender’s release from prison: registration, community notification, 
and residency restrictions. 
Registration laws differ greatly by state, but generally offenders must 
register with local authorities and provide their address, bodily characteristics, 
place of employment, and social security number, along with their vehicle 
license number, make, and model.  Offenders must periodically re-register—
sometimes for life—or face federal criminal charges.  States must meet minimum 
registration requirements under the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children 
and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act of 1994, or face federal budget 
cuts.32 
Notification laws: after an offender relocates from prison to civil life, either 
the offender himself or local authorities are required to notify members and/or 
institutions of the community.  Like registration, the degree of community 
notification is often proportionate to the designated severity of the crime.  
Minimum state notification requirements are also mandated federally by the 
1996 “Megan’s Law.”33  The federal Megan’s Law and its state equivalents 
require sex offender information—often a picture of the offender, his address, 
 
 29. See JOEL BEST, THREATENED CHILDREN: RHETORIC AND CONCERN ABOUT CHILD-VICTIMS 22–31 
(1990); Denno, supra note 16, at 1363 (“the number of statutes passed each year appears to be largely 
unrelated to the rates of rape or sex offenses.”); Freedman, supra note 24, at 84; HUM. RTS. WATCH, 
supra note 17, at 23 (“Sexual violence in the US is, fortunately, decreasing.”); Sutherland, supra note 
19, at 142. 
 30. See Abril R. Bedarf, Comment, Examining Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 83 CAL. 
L. REV. 885 (1995); Boland, supra note 18; Justin H. Boyd, Comment, How to Stop a Predator: The Rush 
to Enact Mandatory Sex Offender Residency Restrictions and Why States Should Abstain, 86 OR. L. REV. 219 
(2007); Bret R. Hobson, Banishing Acts: How Far May States Go to Keep Convicted Sex Offenders Away 
from Children?, 40 GA. L. REV. 961 (2006). 
 31. Some states also civilly commit certain offenders past their prison release date, a practice 
found constitutional in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). On the reemergence of sex predator 
commitment laws and the ways they distort national perceptions of sexual violence see generally 
JANUS, supra note 17. GPS tracking and chemical or surgical castration have also become statutory 
methods of sex offender supervision and regulation over the past twenty years.  For summaries of 
sex offender laws, their costs, empirical validity, deterrent effects, and unintended or unknown 
consequences, see the collection of essays in SEX OFFENDER LAWS: FAILED POLICIES, NEW DIRECTIONS 
(Richard G. Wright ed., 2009). 
 32. Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006).   For a discussion of the Act and its mandates, see Kunz, supra note 18; 
Wayne A. Logan, Liberty Interests in the Preventive State: Procedural Due Process and Sex Offender 
Community Notification Laws, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1167, 1172–1173 (1999). 
 33. Megan’s Law, 42 U.S.C. § 16921 (2006). 
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the crime for which the offender was convicted, the age of the perpetrator and 
the victim at the time of the crime—to be made available for the public at large.  
States and the federal government post much of the information on online sex 
offender databases, which are, generally, freely accessible.34 
Residency restrictions: these are the newest iterations of sex offender laws, 
requiring that sex offenders live outside measured radii of places where children 
congregate, like schools or swimming pools.  In some states, offenders cannot 
live within 500 feet of schools; in other states the radius is 2000 feet.35  These 
laws have some unintended consequences: offenders are effectively prohibited 
from living in entire municipalities, so they overflow into another;36 or, in 
Miami, sex offenders all live together under a bridge, because it is the only locale 
legally far enough from protected institutions.37 
The most recent federal minimum requirements for state sex offender laws 
are set in the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, and failure 
for state compliance will ultimately result in federal funding cuts.38  The AWA 
surpasses the baseline requirements of the Wetterling Act and the Megan’s Law, 
both in scope (whom it covers) and duration (how long offenders must 
register).39  The AWA creates a three-tiered system of sex offenses, labels any 
crime vaguely sexual (public urination) a sex offense,40 requires certain juvenile 
offenders to register,41 compels registration for violent and nonviolent offenses 
alike, compels constant re-registration,42 and mandates that all offenders’ 
personal information be posted online for 15 years, 25 years, or life, depending 
on the tier of the crime.43  The AWA is offense-based, and does not allow for 
individualized, clinical risk assessment to determine whether an offender 
should or should not register, and whether his personal information ought to be 
made available.44  The requirements of the Adam Walsh Act are stricter than 
 
 34. See Maureen S. Hopbell, Article, Balancing the Protection of Children Against the Protection of 
Constitutional Rights: The Past, Present and Future of Megan’s Law, 42 DUQ. L. REV. 331, 341 (2004); 
Jessica Ann Orben, Comment, Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe: Sex Offenders' Due 
Process Under “Megan's Law” and the Effectiveness of Sex Offender Registration, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 789, 
791–92 (2005). 
 35. See Mark Loudon-Brown,  “They Set Him on a Path Where He’s Bound to Get Ill”: Why Sex 
Offender Residency Restrictions Should be Abandoned, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 795, 798–800 (2007). 
 36. Monica Davey, Iowa’s Residency Rules Drive Sex Offenders Underground, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 
2006, at A1. 
 37. See Matthew Singer, Comment and Casenote, . . . And Procedure for All: Rehearings for 
“Dangerous” Offenders, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1067, 1090 (2008); Damien Cave, Roadside Camp for Miami 
Sex Offenders Leads to Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 10, 2009, at A14. 
 38. 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2006). 
 39. Id. § 16911(5)(A)(i) (2006). 
 40. Id. § 16911(2) – (5) (2006). 
 41. Id. § 16911(8) (2006). 
 42. Id. § 16916(1) – (3) (2006). 
 43. Id. § 16915(a)(1) – (3) (2006). 
 44. See Lara Geer Farley, Note, The Adam Walsh Act: The Scarlet Letter of the Twenty-First Century, 
47 WASHBURN L.J. 471 (2008); HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 17, at 37–38. 
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those of most states, and some states have objected that compliance will be 
prohibitively costly.45 
But cost is by no means the only objection to the array of sex offender laws.  
On a policy level, critics object that: sex offender laws do not work, that is, they 
do not reduce sex offenses;46 many laws make no or few assessments of risk, and 
so waste resources tracking the recidivist and the non-recidivist, the violent 
offender and the nonviolent ‘Romeo;’47 the stigmatizing and ostracizing effects 
of registration, notification, and residency restriction may encourage the violent 
behavior they are aimed to deter.  The stress and depression resultant from 
social segregation, bullying, threats, verbal and physical attacks, and 
unemployment, are fertile psychological ground for recidivist, sexually 
aggressive behavior.48 
On a humanitarian level, critics argue that these laws excessively burden 
offenders’ lives and the lives of offenders’ family members.  Offenders often 
cannot reunite with their families because of residency restrictions.49  As a result 
of online notification, offenders are routinely harassed, publicly humiliated, and 
assaulted, and homes of offenders have been burned down or otherwise 
vandalized.50  Facing such responses, some offenders have committed suicide.51  
The humanitarian criticism clusters around the wide net of registration and 
notification, in which the ‘wrong place, wrong time’ offender gets lumped in 
with the playground abductor.  Indeed, a widely shared sentiment is that these 
 
 45. Abby Goodnough & Monica Davey, Effort to Track Sex Offenders Draws Resistance from States, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2009, at A1. 
 46. See Agudo, supra note 18, at 309; Boyd, supra note 30, at 230; Orben, supra note 34, at 806; 
Kunz, supra note 18, at 476.  Jill S. Levenson & Leo P. Cotter, The Effect of Megan’s Law on Sex Offender 
Reintegration, 21 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 49, 52 (2005) (“Little empirical evidence exists to support 
conclusions that Megan’s Law leads to the above-mentioned benefits or consequences, particularly 
those concerning its commonly cited goal of increased public safety.”); Bob Edward Vásquez, et al., 
The Influence of Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws in the United States: A Time-Series 
Analysis, 54 CRIME & DELINQ. 175, 188 (2008) (“The empirical finding of this research is that the sex 
offender legislation seems to have had no uniform and observable influence on the number of rapes 
reported in the states analyzed.”). 
 47. See Agudo, supra note 18, at 332–33; Catherine L. Carpenter, The Constitutionality of Strict 
Liability in Sex Offender Registration Laws, 86 B.U. L. REV. 295, 318 (2006); Farley, supra note 44. 
 48. See Agudo, supra note 18, at 309; Kunz, supra note 18, at 477; HUM, RTS, WATCH, supra note 
17, at 9–10; Levenson & Cotter, supra note 46, at 61–62. 
 49. See Loudon-Brown, supra note 35, at 797–98; Shelley Ross Saxer, Banishment of Sex Offenders: 
Liberty, Protectionism, Justice, and Alternatives, 86 WASH. U. L.R. 1397, 1412, 1453 (2009). 
 50. See Farley, supra note 44, at 494; Kunz, supra note 18, at 476; Orben, supra note 34, at 808.  
Corrigan notes that these incidents of vigilantism, although troubling, are not widespread.  Concerns 
with the problems of sex offender notification laws should not overshadow the fact that many 
convicted sex offenders are not included in online databases. See Corrigan, supra note 17, at 299-304. 
So too, while registration and notification requirements may promote a vision of the state as 
encroaching and invasive, the “statutes permit legislators to claim they are tough on crime without 
remedying systemic problems of inadequate training for police and judges (especially in cases 
involving children), law enforcement insensitivity to victims, abysmal levels of support for victim 
advocacy groups, and lack of treatment options for offenders who seek to change their behavior.”  
Id. at  302. 
 51. See Farley, supra note 44, at 472; Todd S. Purdum, Death of Sex Offender is Tied to Megan’s Law, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 9, 1998, at A16. 
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laws are grossly overbroad.52  As mentioned, the Adam Walsh Act likely 
requires states to label anyone who perpetuates any sexual crime a sex offender, 
including public urination, public indecency, statutory rape, and soliciting a 
prostitute.53 
On a constitutional level, the laws have been challenged on wide-ranging 
grounds, only the most prevalent of which are mentioned here.  One set of 
oppositions revolves around the laws as punishment: if notification, registration, 
and residency restrictions function to punish, their retroactive application 
violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.54  Plaintiffs have also 
argued that the laws are uniquely harsh and disproportionate, violating the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment.55  Another set 
of oppositions maintains that the laws are functional deprivations of liberty or 
equality, thus triggering Fourteenth Amendment protections.  If the law singles 
out and subjects a class of people, i.e. sex offenders, to unfair treatment without 
rational basis – without any reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest – 
the law contravenes Equal Protection guarantees.56  If the law provides no 
administrative process to oppose registration and notification requirements, or 
no individualized risk-assessment, plaintiffs argue the laws violate procedural 
due process.57  Finally, claimants maintain that the intrusions into their privacy, 
the restrictions on their travel and residency, the consequent “stigma plus” the 
social consequences of stigma, amount to a violation of substantive due process, 
to infractions of fundamental rights that warrant strict scrutiny review.58  On 
 
 52. See Agudo, supra note 18; cf. Corrigan, infra note 167. 
 53. Although these are “tier 1” offenders, the least serious in the three-tiered system, they may 
nonetheless be listed online as sex offenders for fifteen years, reducible to ten at judicial discretion.  
See 42 U.S.C. § 16915(a)(1)-(3), 16915(b)(2)(A) (2006). 
 54. See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 404 (N.J. 1995) (holding that registration and notification 
laws are not punitive); Boland, supra note 18, at 202 (“Registration is frequently applied 
retrospectively, but it has been upheld against ex post facto challenges in nearly every instance 
because most courts view registration as a regulation, not a punishment.  Notification has faced 
limited challenges and the results have varied.”); See, infra notes 64–75 and accompanying text. 
 55. See Rainer v. Georgia, No. S09A1900, 2010 2010 Ga. LEXIS 229, at *4 (Ga. Mar. 15, 
2010)(“[B]ecause the registration requirements themselves do not constitute punishment, it is of no 
consequence whether or not one has committed an offense that is “sexual” in nature before being 
required to register … The nature of the offense requiring the registration would not somehow 
change the registration requirements themselves into a form of “punishment” for purposes of an 
Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment analysis.”); Kunz, supra note 18, at 467–68 (“In 
the majority of cases, challenges claiming that notification and registration laws impose cruel and 
unusual punishment have failed.”). 
 56. See Poritz, 662 A.2d at 413 (“Classification of plaintiff based on his conviction of one of the 
enumerated sex offenses and his characterization as a repetitive compulsive offender is rationally 
related to the government's interest in protection of the public.  The need for public safety outweighs 
the restrictions placed upon plaintiff as a result of his inclusion in this class.  We conclude therefore 
that the registration and notification requirements do not violate plaintiff's right to equal protection 
under either the Federal or State Constitution.”); Hobson, supra note 30, at 988; Kunz, supra note 18, 
at 468 (“Challenges to notification on equal protection grounds have proved unsuccessful as well.”). 
 57. See sources cited infra notes 76–87 and accompanying text. 
 58. See Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2005); Doe v. Tandeske, 361 F.3d 594 (9th Cir. 
2004); Hobson, supra note 30, at 972 (“Convicted sex offenders have brought unsuccessful 
substantive due process challenges against various types of post-release restrictions. . . . [C]ircuit 
courts have ruled that the statutes in question do not infringe the asserted fundamental right.”).  
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these 14th Amendment challenges, the policy critique bleeds into the 
constitutional one: since there is some empirical evidence that these laws do the 
opposite of their intended objectives, there may be no rational basis for them 
and, so the argument proceeds, for their enactment and enforcement.59 
Why is all of this important?  Because none of it matters. 
Despite the laws’ being bad policy, morally and physically devastating, and 
constitutionally questionable, legislatures continue to push them through, and 
courts (mostly) continue to reject objections on all counts.60  Some courts have 
placed temporary injunctions on the most egregious components of the law,61 
and few courts have ruled that blanket registration, notification, and residency 
requirements without attention to degrees of dangerousness, risk assessment, or 
administrative process of appeal violate due process protections.62  
Nevertheless, the 2003 Supreme Court cases on sex offender laws to which this 
article now turns soundly reject claims that registration and notification are 
either punitive or in conflict with procedural due process protections. 
PART II: JOHN DOES AND THE SUPREME COURT 
Two cases on sex offender laws made their way up to the Supreme Court 
by 2003.  In Smith v. Doe,63 the respondents (two John Does and the wife of one) 
claimed that since they were convicted of sex offenses prior to the enactment of 
Alaska’s registration and notification laws, retroactive application violated Ex 
Post Facto.64  They argued that the continued requirement of registration and re-
registration as sex offenders, and the continual community notification of their 
sex offender status via the Internet and other forms of public announcement, 
constituted a form of punishment.65 
 
Regarding a liberty interest in reputation, see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) and infra notes 79–82, 
and accompanying text; regarding Tandeske and similar dismissals of substantive due process claims, 
see infra notes 147–53 and accompanying text. 
 59. See generally Boland, supra note 18; Loudon-Brown, supra note 35; Singer, supra note 
37(offering examples of the many negative counter-effects of sex offender laws). 
 60. See sources cited supra notes 54–58. 
 61. See Catrin Einhorn, Judge Blocks Rules Limiting Sex Offenders on Halloween, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 
2008, at A12 (“A federal judge in Missouri . . . blocked parts of a new state law that requires sexual 
offenders to remain in their homes on Halloween evening and to avoid any contact with children 
related to the holiday.”); Stephanie Chen, After Prison, Few Places for Sex Offenders to Live, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 19, 2009, at A16 (reporting on a federal court injunction against a 2006 Georgia law prohibiting 
sex offenders from residing within 1000 feet of school bus stops). 
 62. See State v. Bani, 36 P.3d 1255, 1257 (Haw. 2001) (holding that a public notice of defendant as 
a sex offender, “without notice, an opportunity to be heard, or any preliminary determination of 
whether and to what extent [defendant] actually represent[ed] a danger to society” violated due 
process requirements). 
 63. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003). 
 64. Id. at 91.  John Doe I was convicted of sexually abusing his daughter for two years, when she 
was 9 to 11 years old.  John Doe II was convicted of sexually abusing a 14-year-old.  Both pleaded 
nolo contendere.  They were released from prison in 1990 and completed rehabilitation programs.  The 
Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act was passed on May 12, 1994. 
 65. Id. at 91-92. 
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Delivering the majority opinion and reversing the Ninth Circuit decision,66 
Justice Kennedy ruled that Alaska’s notification and registration laws are 
regulative, not punitive, and therefore trigger no Ex Post Facto problem, since 
one cannot be punished retroactively, but one can be regulated.67  To determine 
if a statute is regulatory or punitive, the Court first looks to legislative intent.68  
The manifest intent of the Alaskan legislature was evidently regulatory: it 
sought to protect the public health, not to punish offenders.  Thus, the Court 
turns to criteria enumerated under Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez that may 
determine laws to be punitive despite their evidently regulatory intent.69  The 
factors that may override legislative intent include whether the law: (1) has 
historically been regarded as punitive; (2) imposes an affirmative disability or 
restraint; (3) has a rational connection to a nonpunitive objective; and, (4) is 
excessive in respect to its purpose.70  The Court determined that sex offender 
laws reach none of these thresholds.  The laws are dissimilar to colonial acts of 
shaming and humiliating; they are reasonably related to rates of recidivism; no 
physical restraint is imposed on offenders; and difficulty in finding employment 
or housing on account of notification is “conjecture.”71  Dissenting, Justice 
Ginsburg argued that the absence of an assessment of dangerousness or an 
assessment of individualized likelihood of recidivism marks the laws 
excessive,72 and Justice Stevens insisted that the majority’s reliance on the 
presumptive recidivism of offenders in fact substantiates the Ex Post Facto 
claim, as it singles out a subset of persons for legal restraint.73  Both Ginsburg 
and Stevens also documented the threats, assaults, evictions, and arson faced by 
offenders, which Kennedy and the majority overlooked, that might constitute 
affirmative restraint.74 
In Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, Doe argued that 
Connecticut’s registration and notification laws violated procedural due process 
 
 66. Doe I v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the Alaska Sex Offender 
Registration Act violated the Ex Post Facto Clause). 
 67. Smith, 538 U.S. at 94 (states can pass retroactive laws as long as they are exercised under the 
state’s regulatory power and not intended to be punitive). Eric Janus observes that states enacted sex 
offender registration, notification, and commitment laws under civil codes precisely to bypass the 
constitutional checks that restrain criminal law. See JANUS, supra note 17, at 20 (“The fact that civil 
regulatory measures allowed the states to circumvent constitutional limitations that would 
otherwise limit their powers was the central driving force behind the new laws.”). 
 68. Id. at 92. 
 69. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Smith, 538 U.S. at 97-106. 
 72. Id. at 116-17 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[P]ast crime alone, not current dangerousness, is the 
‘touchstone’ triggering the Act’s obligations.  . . . This  Touchstone adds to the impression that the 
Act retributively targets past guilt.”). 
 73. Id. at 113 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that a restriction imposed only on someone who 
commits a criminal offense is “punishment”). 
 74. Id. at 111 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (comparing the requirements to those placed on criminals 
on parole); id. at 115 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the Act “imposes onerous and intrusive 
obligations”). 
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protections guaranteed by the 14th Amendment.75  Since the laws allegedly 
deprived him of protected liberty rights, the state, under prior case law,76 ought 
to be required to administer a “predeprivation hearing” to assess Doe’s 
dangerousness and determine whether registration and notification are indeed 
applicable.77 
The protected liberty interest in balance is one of reputation.  Although the 
Court has consistently ruled that damage to reputation alone (from the 
dissemination of truthful information, for example) does not qualify as a 
protected liberty interest,78 the “stigma plus” test outlined in Paul v. Davis79 
stipulates that procedural protections are warranted when “the injury to 
reputation [is] accompanied by a change in the injured person’s status or 
rights.”80  In Doe’s case, the “plus” is his change in legal status to “sex 
offender.”81 
Delivering a brief, unanimous decision reversing the Second Circuit 
opinion,82 Justice Rehnquist ruled that first, there are no protected liberty 
interests of the sex offender violated by notification and registration laws and 
second, even if there were, no predeprivation hearing would be necessary.83  
Such a hearing must be “material to the State’s statutory scheme,” or in plainer 
speak, must be related to the law in question.84  John Doe, argued Rehnquist, 
mistakenly assumed that Connecticut’s laws were enacted to supervise 
dangerous people, and that his dangerousness ought to be assessed.  But the laws 
target sex offenders as a class, make no reference to dangerousness, and so 
dangerousness is irrelevant.85  No hearing is necessary to establish his legal 
 
 75. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 1-8 (2003) (Respondent, a convicted sex 
offender, argued that the Connecticut law violated procedural due process because it did not require 
a hearing to determine whether he was currently dangerous.). 
 76. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (requiring inquiry into additional 
procedural safeguards); Fullmer v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 207 F. Supp. 2d 650, 654-55 (E.D. 
Mich. 2002) (stating that the plaintiff, a sex offender, had a right to be free from government 
defamation, entitling him to certain procedural safeguards). 
 77. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 538 U.S. at 4. 
 78. See Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 628 (1977) (no protected liberty interest for a police officer 
who had negative, but truthful, information placed in his public personnel file). 
 79. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 705 (1976) (holding that without any change in legal status, 
stigma imposed as a result of action by the Attorney General does not invoke protection under the 
Due Process Clause). 
 80. Beitzell v. Jeffrey, 643 F.2d 870, 878 (1st Cir. 1981); see also Orben, supra note 34, at 56. 
 81. See Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety ex rel. Lee, 271 F.3d 38, 45-46 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that a 
change in legal status to sex offender constituted a “plus” factor). 
 82. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 538 U.S. at 4. 
 83. Id. at 7-8. 
 84. Id. at 4. 
 85. However, the Connecticut statute grants judicial discretion in exempting some offenders 
from registration and notification requirements, a detail which Justice Rehnquist omits and which 
may compromise (and authorize) his ruling that dangerousness is immaterial.  See CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 54-251(b), (c) (West 2009). Particular offenders may be exempted if determined not to 
threaten public safety.  I owe this well-made point to Gabriel Baldwin, Connecticut Department of 
Public Safety v. Doe: The Supreme Court's Clarification of Whether Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Laws Violate Convicted Sex Offenders' Right to Procedural Due Process, 24 J. NAT’L ASS’N 
ADMIN.  L. JUDGES 383, 393-94 (2004). 
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status as a sex offender, a status confirmed by conviction.  In concurring 
opinions, Justices Ginsburg and Souter also reject the procedural challenge, but 
suggested that equal protection and substantive liberty claims might still be 
available to Doe and those similarly situated. 
PART III: A REVISIONIST READING OF SMITH AND CONNECTICUT OR HOW THE COURT 
DOES THINGS WITH SEX OFFENDERS86 
The analyses of Parts III and IV closely track the arguments in Smith and 
Connecticut alongside the arguments advanced in Bowers that were subsequently 
and vehemently rejected by Lawrence.  This comparison is made to substantiate 
the claim that, whether or not sex offender laws are ultimately constitutional, 
these laws, like the socio-juridical construction of the sex offender himself, 
inform a judicial imaginary that fictively stabilizes and isolates sexual harm onto 
discrete bodies and character types.  The Court does so in, and because of, a 
national climate increasingly sexually pluralistic and socially progressive where 
the homosexual is no longer a sufficient repository for sexual amorality.  Put 
perhaps too simply, where the homo/hetero distinction once divided the 
sexually moral from the amoral and consent/nonconsent divided the sexually 
harmful from the non-harmful, the consent/nonconsent divide, in the wake of 
Lawrence, does double duty, partitioning morality and harm.  The Court’s 
consent/nonconsent distinction is therefore overburdened and overdrawn, 
covering at once too little and too much.  It is unable to diagnose or mitigate 
sexual injustice that is legally consensual (too little),87 and it smuggles in sexual 
practices considered amoral and designates them nonconsensual and harmful 
(too much).88  It is the fragility and volatility of this distinction that the figure of 
the sex offender stills and obscures. 
 
 86. I borrow this phrase from J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (2d ed. 1976).  
Although Austin initially sought to distinguish “constantive” speech acts that correspond to 
objective reality (“the cloud is in the sky”) from “performative” speech acts that produce reality (“I 
do,” at a wedding ceremony), he eventually confounded his own typology, proposing instead that 
all speech acts produce certain effects or perform functions that exceed or subtend the simply 
referential component.  My claim here is that while the Court understands itself as describing, 
referencing, and reporting on sex offenders and sex offender law, it simultaneously, through that 
very same “speech,” produces the sex offender and the ancillary concepts of sexual harm (Smith and 
Connecticut) and sexual freedom (Lawrence).  On the adoption of Austin’s theory of performative 
speech to the cultural construction of gender see generally BUTLER, supra note 19; see also Paul 
Kelleher, How to Do Things with Perversion: Psychoanalysis and the “Child in Danger,” in CURIOUSER 151, 
supra note 14. 
 87. See sources cited supra note 12. 
 88. See sources cited supra note 13; Harcourt, supra note 15. Analogously, Sarah Jain 
compellingly argues that the contemporary formation of U.S. product safety and injury law 
discursively delimits what does and does not count as injury and who can or cannot make claims to 
being injured, while it obscures systemic injury endemic to a capitalist consumer economy. See 
SARAH S. LOCHLANN JAIN, INJURY: THE POLITICS OF PRODUCT DESIGN AND SAFETY LAW IN THE UNITED 
STATES 34, 52 (2006) (“The compensation system thus brooks attention from both the ways in which 
consumption injures as a matter of course and the ways in which injury itself is a productive force … 
What happens, then, when we see the law not as a neutral adjudicator but as constituting the terms 
of citizenship? How does injury culture instruct its subjects to understand wounding?”). 
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The following three subsections explicate how the Court constructs the 
sociopolitical figure of the sex offender, and Part IV suggests in more detail why 
it does so. 
IIIa.Sodomizing and Recidivating 
To overturn Bowers, the majority opinion of Lawrence deploys a battery of 
arguments, the first of which is an accusation of bad faith historicism.89  For 
Bowers, part of the rational basis for sodomy laws was a presumably historic, 
uninterrupted, Judeo-Christian moral aversion to homosexuals and their 
sodomitical acts.  Bowers maintained that longstanding proscriptions against 
sodomy testified to a universal moral code that disapproved of homosexuals 
and homosexuality.90  In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy countermands the assertion 
on several fronts.  First, sodomy laws were originally enacted and enforced to 
protect people deemed incapable of consent—they were not aimed to target 
homosexuals; second, sodomy laws that did focus on same-sex sex were only 
recently drafted, in the 1970s; third, most states have repealed their sodomy 
statutes.91  These three arguments taken together challenged both the claim that 
sodomy laws historically manifested disapproval of homosexuality, and the 
claim that such disapproval is widely shared.92  Justice Kennedy also 
remarkably observed that the homosexual is an historical invention of the 19th 
century, and thus could not have been singled out by colonial sodomy laws 
because he did not—as a category—yet exist.93 
Important here is the degree to which the Lawrence Court felt compelled to 
do its history homework, citing scholars of colonial America and gay and 
lesbian studies.94  Also important is that not far from the surface of Lawrence is 
the suspicion that homophobia directed and then marred Bowers’ selective use of 
history, and that homophobia does not a good constitutional decision make, 
blinding or mischaracterizing the facts of the case.  “At the very least,” writes 
Kennedy, Bowers’ history was “overstated,” and he scrutinizes Justice Burger’s 
“sweeping references” to the moral reprobation of homosexuality.95 
Just three months before Justice Kennedy’s compelling performance as a 
revisionist historian, he and the majority for which he wrote categorically 
refused to ask similar historical or social scientific questions about the behavior 
of sex offenders.  The backbone of Kennedy’s opinion in Smith, and Rehnquist’s 
opinion in Connecticut, is the uncritical presumption of high recidivism, the great 
 
 89. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568 (2003) (noting that early sodomy laws were not 
aimed at homosexuals). 
 90. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-94 (1986) (“[p]roscriptions against [homosexuality] 
have ancient roots”). 
 91. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568-70. 
 92. See id. at 571-72 (“the historical grounds relied upon in Bowers.  . . . are not without doubt”). 
 93. Id. at 568 (citing JONATHAN NED KATZ, THE INVENTION OF HETEROSEXUALITY 10 (1995) and 
JOHN D’EMILIO & ESTELLE FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 121 
(2d ed. 1997).); see also FOUCAULT, supra note 19. 
 94. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568. 
 95. Id. at 571-72. 
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likelihood that sex offenders will re-offend.96  As mentioned above, the Smith 
Court found Alaska’s registration and notification requirements regulatory, not 
punitive.  Justice Kennedy approvingly cites Alaska’s 1994 legislative finding 
that “sex offenders pose a high risk of reoffending” as evidencing a regulatory 
purpose, protecting public safety.97  Reversing the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that the 
Alaska requirements were “excessive in relation to its regulatory purpose” 
because the laws did not track dangerousness,98 Kennedy writes: 
Alaska could conclude that a conviction for a sex offense provides evidence of a 
substantial risk of recidivism.  The legislature’s findings are consistent with 
grave concerns over the high rate of recidivism among convicted sex offenders 
and their dangerousness as a class.  The risk of recidivism posed by sex 
offenders is ‘frightening and high.’99 
Kennedy also cites two Bureau of Justice and Statistics studies, conducted 
in 1983 and 1997, which allegedly claim that convicted sex offenders are more 
likely to commit sexual crimes than other criminals.100  In other words, the 
classification “sex offender” indexes dangerousness, so no further assessment is 
necessary.  Further, it is the presumption of dangerousness that hedges against a 
punitive reading of registration and notification requirements: although 
targeting “sex offenders” as a class may look like punishment, the 
“dangerousness as a class” turns the laws regulatory, protective, and 
constitutional.101 
Justice Rehnquist introduces his opinion in Connecticut, citing McKune v. 
Lile: “Sex offenders are a serious threat to the nation,” and reports as well that 
the victims of sex assaults are mostly juveniles, and that recidivism runs 
disproportionately high among sex offenders.102  Strikingly, it is the 
dangerousness inherent in the class of criminals, a dangerousness Connecticut 
has a legitimate interest in containing, that neutralizes any claim to an 
individualized risk-assessment under the Due Process Clause.  Sex offenders are 
threateningly recidivistic by legal designation.  Respondents “alleged 
nondangerousness simply does not matter,” and is immaterial to the state 
regulatory scheme, but only because that scheme depends on the presumption 
of “serious threat,” or high recidivism (one may already sense the tautological 
force at work here, to be discussed later).103 
Concurring, Justice Scalia also asserts that since the notification scheme 
targets sex offenders as a class rather than dangerousness per se, an assessment 
 
 96. See Smith v. Doe 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003); Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 4 
(2003). 
 97. Smith, 538 U.S. at 103. 
 98. Doe I v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979, 992-94 (9th Cir. 2001) . 
 99. Smith, 538 U.S. at 103 (citing McKune v. Lile 536 U.S. 24, 34 (2002)). 
 100. Id.  See Bureau of Justice Statistics studies discussed infra notes 110-11, 113, 115. 
 101. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 103.  (Despite the punitive appearance of the law, Kennedy uses the 
high recidivism statistics to show that the intent of Alaska legislature was not to punish, but to 
exercise its police power to enhance public safety). 
 102. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 3 (citing McKune 536 U.S. at 32-33) (2003). 
 103. Id. at 7 (stating that Connecticut has chosen to make all sex offenders, regardless of current 
dangerousness, subject to the public disclosure law). 
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of dangerousness is immaterial and void as a matter of due process 
protection.104  He reasons by analogy: a sex offender who claims he has been 
deprived of liberty without due process because his dangerousness has not been 
individually determined is as nonsensical as a fifteen year-old who claims that a 
law prohibiting him from driving on account of his young age is a due process 
violation unless his driving safety skills are tested.105  He does not explain the 
analogy, but it seems to be about a shared obviousness and absurdity in both 
cases.  It is obvious that most children are not capable of driving, and absurd to 
suggest there is no rational state interest in barring children from driving.  It is 
obvious that sex offenders sex offend, and absurd to suggest there is no rational 
state interest in tracking and publicizing their location and activities.106  
Moreover, it is the sex offending that vitiates any claim to ethical or 
constitutional competency on the part of the offender—due process is 
inapplicable for those, like children and sexual sociopaths, legislatively scripted 
as incapable of self-assessment.  The law and its representatives are the 
competent constitutional surveyors. 
The central problem with Kennedy’s and Rehnquist’s opinions, and Scalia’s 
cryptic analogy, is that the social fact of recidivism is just social.  Evidence of sex 
offender recidivism from the 1980s into the present is complicated and 
contested, but generally national, state, and private research studies suggest 
that, if anything, sex offenders have some of the lowest recidivism rates among 
criminals.107  So too, recidivism varies hugely by the particular crime, so any 
generalized statistic is definitionally bogus.108  There is much state discretion in 
determining who is a ‘sex offender,’ and that broadened category exceeds the 
 
 104. Id. at 8-9 (Scalia, J., concurring) (As the law was properly enacted, sex offenders no longer 
have a right to a process to demonstrate that they are not dangerous.). 
 105. Id. (“[A] convicted sex offender has no more right to additional ‘process’ enabling him to 
establish that he is not dangerous . . . than a 15-year-old has a right to ‘process’ enabling him to 
establish that he is a safe driver.”). 
 106. See, e.g., Baldwin, supra note 85, at 395-96.  Baldwin proposes that the analogy may overlook 
the judicial exemptions to the Connecticut notification requirements, exemptions premised on an 
individualized assessment of dangerousness.  However, both the infantilization of the sex offender 
and the naturalization of his alleged dangerousness advance a judicial “subject creation” of the sex 
offender as a childlike container for lawlessness and sexual perversity, discussed in Part IV.  On 
jurisprudence, policing and the creation of criminal subjects, see BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF 
ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 160-84 (2001). 
 107. See CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., MYTHS AND FACTS ABOUT SEX 
OFFENDERS (2000), available at http://www.csom.org/pubs/mythsfacts.pdf.  Multiple studies are 
cited in Boyd, supra note 30, at 230; HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 17, at 25-35; Hobson, supra note 30, 
at 965; KINCAID, supra note 14, at 95; Kunz, supra note 18, at 471-73.  See also Francis M. Williams, The 
Problem of Sexual Assault, and Karen J. Terry & Alissa R. Acherman, A Brief History of Major Sex 
Offender Laws, in SEX OFFENDER LAWS: FAILED POLICIES, NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 31, at 18, 92. 
Kim English convincingly suggests that low recidivism rates may result in part from the well-known 
problem of low reporting rates by victims, yet this is precisely the policy problem with registration 
and notification laws. They target convicted offenders who have been reported, rather than on 
unreported sexual violence by family members and acquaintances.  See Kim English, The 
Containment Approach to Managing Sex Offenders, in SEX OFFENDER LAWS: FAILED POLICIES, NEW 
DIRECTIONS, supra note 31, at 428. 
 108. See CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 109, at 2 (“[R]eoffense 
rates vary among different types of sex offenders and are related to specific characteristics of the 
offender and the offense.”). 
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typical subject populations of recidivist studies, namely violent offenders (the 
1997 Bureau of Justice and Statistics study, discussed below, examines the 
behaviors of only those who were convicted of rape and sexual assault).109  
Given too that over 90% of sex offenses against children are committed either by 
family members or family acquaintances, the recidivist stranger seems like a 
doubly wrong concern for public or legislative attention.110  The Justice Center, 
an organization critical of Alaska’s statues and the Court’s approval of them, 
notes that the “legislature did not attempt to distinguish among types of 
offenders or to evaluate which offender were most likely to recidivate.”111  Thus, 
an older teenager who has sex with a younger teenager is a “sex offender.”  
What does it mean to suggest that he is a high recidivist? 
Perhaps most importantly, the Bureau of Justice and Statistics studies 
referenced by Kennedy and Rehnquist do not say what the Justices want them to 
say.  Sex offenders, according to these studies, do not recidivate at a higher rate 
than other criminals.  If any fact could be comported to sustain the claim, it is 
the supposition that rapists are 10.5% more likely to commit rape than other 
convicts who have not raped, a number pared down to 4.2% in a 1994 BJS 
study.112  But all this means is that rapists are more likely to rape than other 
criminals who have not raped.  A rapist is more likely to commit rape in the future 
than is an armed robber.  This simply cannot intend that sex offender recidivism 
is “frightening and high” or that “sex offenders are a serious threat to the 
nation.”113  Indeed, what Kennedy omits to report is more illustrative than his 
selective citations.  Violent sex offenders were less likely to be on “probation or 
parole prior to prison admission” than other violent offenders.114  So too, rapists 
were less likely to be rearrested for violent felonies than “most categories of 
probationers with convictions of violence.”115  The studies offer no data on 
nonviolent offenders who would be labeled sex offenders by both the 
Connecticut and Alaska statutes and the Adam Walsh Act provisions. 
(Incidentally, if the sex offender were unrelentingly recidivistic, there is no 
good reason registration and notification would help ensure public safety—this 
same violent predator would presumably be undeterred by the publication of 
his name on the Internet, and precautionary efforts, short of locking one’s self 
and one’s children away from the world forever, would be futile.  Were the 
registries and notification schemes not disorganized and inefficient, they might 
 
 109. See LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., Sex Offenses and Offenders: An Analysis 
of Data on Rape and Sexual Assault (1997), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
SOO.PDF. 
 110. See generally SNYDER, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT, supra note 17; see also HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra 
note 17, at 24-25; Richard G. Wright, Introduction: The Failure of Sex Offender Policies, in SEX OFFENDER 
LAWS: FAILED POLICIES, NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 31, at 4. 
 111. Deborah Periman, Revisiting Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration and Public Notification Statute, 
25 ALASKA JUST. F. 2 (2008), available at http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/forum/25/1-
2springsummer2008/ c_asora.html. 
 112. See PATRICK LANGAN ET AL., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994 11 
(2002), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf. 
 113. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003). 
 114. See GREENFELD, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., supra note 110, at 25. 
 115. Id. at 25-26. 
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provide police with suspects post facto, but that is surely a colder kind of 
comfort.) 
Meanwhile, where the homosexual of Lawrence is a recent, historical, and 
conceptual figure of modernity,116 the sex offender of Smith and Connecticut 
appears transhistoric, prediscursive, and perverted.117  Like hardcore 
pornography, the Court knows a sex offender when it sees one.118  That the “sex 
offender” is an explicitly legal construct seems only to suggest to the Court that 
the law applies a concept to a person, but that the concept is simply right in its 
ascription: these people are like this—threatening, recidivistic, pathologically 
violent—we just hadn’t come up with a name for it yet.  Recourse to false 
suppositions of recidivism, and to invocations of the impending threat of the sex 
offender, occludes the huge range of people classified as such, and assumes their 
constitutive immunity to therapy and rehabilitation.  The sex offender is 
imagined as a hypersexualized and unremorseful Voldemort who keeps coming 
back for Harry.119 
The point is unequivocally not that sexual crimes are unserious or that they 
do not carry severe consequences for their victims.  Rather, the severity and 
seriousness of these crimes is, by selective judicial interpretation and 
deployment of social scientific studies, transformed into a misleading 
characterization of these crimes’ prevalence and persistence.  In other words, it 
seems rather clear that both the judicial and national concern with sex offenses is 
not their comparative rate of occurrences but rather their heinousness.  Yet, the 
focus on rates and recidivism (and incidentally, almost no discussion about the 
physiological consequences to victims) constructs the problem in a particular 
and inaccurate but strangely comforting fashion.  Perhaps the anxiety generated 
by the heinousness of sex crimes is offset by imagining a contained 
subpopulation—regulated, constricted, publicized—as the sole perps.  More 
substantive hypotheses follow in Part IV.  In any event, Justice White in Bowers 
rehearsed a grand and bogus story about sodomy laws and transhistorical 
Judeo-Christian morality to characterize the homosexual as a criminological 
type undeserving of constitutional protections.120  Justice Kennedy refuted that 
story in Lawrence while recycling its rhetorical form in Smith: selectively using 
and misusing history and social science to project an image of a sex offender 
whose dangerousness and recidivism precludes constitutional questions about 
punishment and procedure.121  At the moment incapacitating history and 
 
 116. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U,S, 558, 568 (2003) (noting that homosexuality as a concept did 
not exist in the 19th century). 
 117. See FOUCAULT, supra note 19at 43. 
 118. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).  Of course, the question 
before the Warren Court was whether or not a film was obscene (Stewart concluded it was not).  
Before the Rehnquist Court, John Doe is already a sex offender, settling the question prior to its being 
asked.  Thus, the question, “Are sex offender registries and notification systems rational and 
regulatory?” comes to be synonymous with the tautological and self-evident, “Do sex offenders sex 
offend?”  This is the logic underpinning Justice Scalia’s concurrence-by-analogy in Connecticut 
Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003), discussed supra notes 103-06. 
 119. See LEE EDELMAN, NO FUTURE: QUEER THEORY AND THE DEATH DRIVE 1-31 (2004). 
 120. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-92 (1986). 
 121. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003). 
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debilitating myth are dislodged from the juridical image of the homosexual, 
analogous “truths” and behaviors are rebuilt into the figure of the sex offender 
on the premise of a seemingly solid social science. 
IIIb.Stuck (Again) Between Acts and Identities 
In Lawrence, the majority refused the narrowing interpretation Bowers gave 
to appellant Hardwick’s liberty deprivation claim.  Justice White’s appraisal in 
Bowers of the liberty claim as “a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage 
in sodomy,” according to Justice Kennedy in Lawrence, “demea[ned] the claim 
the individual put forward.”122  Such misinterpretation, analogized Kennedy, is 
like suggesting married people’s claims to privacy rights are tantamount to 
claims to copulate.123  More, much more for Kennedy, is packed into the liberties 
Hardwick and Lawrence sought, rights of intimate association, spatial privacy, 
and finding meaning in human relations.124 
Kennedy is drawing attention to the rhetorical shuttling between acts and 
identities which underwrite the Bowers decision throughout, a shuttling Janet 
Halley noted over fifteen years ago.125  As Halley observed, in order to disfigure 
and then disparage Hardwick’s rights claim, the Court equated homosexual 
identity to the act of sodomy.  Reframing the question as such, the Court 
unsurprisingly found no fundamental constitutional liberty to engage in 
homosexual sodomy.126  You knew Bowers was over before it began when Justice 
White went looking into the Constitution for gay sex.127  Conversely, when the 
Bowers Court entertained whether or not a rational basis existed for Georgia’s 
gender-neutral sodomy law, it found that basis in the supposedly longstanding 
moral condemnation of homosexuality.128  Homosexual identity legitimates 
criminalizing sodomitical acts.  Where one might conclude that maneuvering 
between acts and identities, between dismissing the claims lodged from one axis 
by invoking the other, might reveal the decision’s self-contradiction, Halley 
instead maintains that there is a “homophobic power” in this kind of discursive 
incoherence.  It is this incoherence that allows Justice White and Burger to bar 
the homosexual from constitutional shelter, and to immunize heterosexual 
sodomy from state supervision.129 
Is there a similar act/identity rhetorical strategy at play in Smith and 
Connecticut?  (You might predict where I’m heading, given my rhetorical 
question about rhetorical questions.)  In Connecticut, plaintiffs argued that, since 
Connecticut did not undertake individual risk assessment of offenders or 
 
 122. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 566-67 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id.  See generally Tribe, supra note 4. 
 125. See generally Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721 (1993). 
 126. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191 (finding no connection between family or marriage and 
homosexuality and discussing homosexual sodomy). 
 127. Halley, supra note 126, at 1750.  See infra note 133. 
 128. Halley, supra note 126, at 1768-70.  See also Bowers 478 U.S. at 196 (holding that anti-sodomy 
laws are not unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause). 
 129. Halley, supra note 126, at 1756-57. 
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provide procedures for appealing the registration and notification requirements, 
the law violated procedural due process.130  The majority responded that since 
the law was not tracking dangerousness, but rather keeping the subpopulation 
of sex offenders in check, there was no procedural hang up.131  There was no 
requirement for an administrative appeal process because the rational basis for 
monitoring sex offenders is that they are sex offenders, not that they are more or 
less dangerous.132  There is nothing in need of appeal.  They are, after all, sex 
offenders, and that is who is being targeted by the state.  However, in Smith, the 
Does argued that sex offender laws are punitive because they unfairly target a 
subpopulation, invasively interfere with their lives, have negative social 
consequences, and so forth, thus triggering Ex Post Facto protection.133  Here, 
the court responded that sex offender laws are not punitive because they have 
regulatory intent, because these laws are aimed to minimize dangerousness and protect 
public safety.134  In essence, when the offender argues he is punished, the court 
declares he is merely being regulated or prevented.  When the offender argues 
he is being regulated or prevented (without procedural safeguards), the court 
countermands that he is being punished, or at least singled out by virtue of 
conviction. 
Now, the Court maintains that singling out and regulating subpopulations 
based on prior conviction is not ipso facto punitive.135  This is true by precedent, 
but deflects the more important antecedent assumption, that dangerousness is 
the glue that holds the legal construction—and legal fiction—of sex offenders 
together in Smith.  The ruling in Smith relies upon its prior ruling in Kansas v. 
Hendricks, where the Court found that Kansas could civilly commit sex offenders 
indeterminately because they pose continuous danger to the community.136  
Hendricks governs Smith: containing dangerousness is regulatory and outweighs 
the punitive potential.137  But Hendricks requires individual risk assessment, and 
Smith does not.  Justice Kennedy argues that individualized risk assessment is 
not necessary because notification and registration are not as severe as 
confinement, and because, as discussed, sex offenders are definitionally high 
recidivists.138  We have now reached the apex of absurdity, and the more one 
reads Smith and Connecticut against each other, the more puzzlingly incoherent 
they both become.  The Court relies on Hendricks in Smith but dismisses what 
Hendricks held to be critical, the assessment of dangerousness, even though 
dangerousness is the regulatory target of Alaska.  When the sex offender in 
Connecticut requests that his dangerousness be evaluated, his dangerousness is 
rendered immaterial to his legal status as a sex offender, even though future 
dangerousness is understood as what makes the sex offender a sex offender, by 
 
 130. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 5-6 (2003). 
 131. Id. at 4. 
 132. Id. at 7-8. 
 133. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003). 
 134. Id. 538 U.S. at 103. 
 135. Id. at 103-04. 
 136. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357 (1997). 
 137. Id.; Smith, 538 U.S. at 104. 
 138. Smith, 538 U.S. at 104. 
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Justices Kennedy of Smith and Justices Rehnquist and Scalia of Connecticut.139  
We can extend Halley’s observation on the rhetorical management of the 
homosexual in the Bowers imaginary to the rhetorical management of the sex 
offender in the imaginaries of Smith and Connecticut.  When the sex offender 
claims his identity (a convicted sex offender) is unfairly penalized, the Court 
argues his (future dangerous) acts trump any incurred penalty.  When the sex 
offender claims his acts (or lack of acting) deserve particularized treatment, the 
Court rejoins that his (legal) identity renders his (lack of) acting moot.  John Doe, 
like Michael Hardwick, juridically ricochets between acts and identities: acts are 
transmuted into identity, and identity comes to betray a set of presumed acts.  
Constitutional protections fall by the wayside.  But let me be clear: unlike 
Hardwick and Lawrence, who engaged in consensual oral and anal sex 
respectively, the John Does sexually molested children.  The actions of the Does 
are neither equated with those of Lawrence and Hardwick nor are they excused 
by analyzing the strategies utilized to frame the relevant constitutional 
questions. 
IIIc.Straw Liberties 
As discussed above, Justice White infamously contorted Hardwick’s liberty 
claim of privacy into the patently spurious claim that the Constitution provides 
a “fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.”140  In contrast, 
for Kennedy, the liberty claim was rather about spatial privacy, consensual 
intimacy, discovering transcendental mysteries intersubjectively, and human 
flourishing.141  As far as I know, this is the most robust—which is not to say 
most consistent or justified—understanding of substantive due process to 
date.142 
What happens when sex offenders claim their fundamental liberties have 
been infringed by the state? 
First, neither the John Does of Smith nor of Connecticut make claims to 
substantive liberty, although Justice Souter’s concurring opinion in Connecticut 
nods in that direction.143  Secondarily, the protected liberty often claimed by sex 
offenders in lower court cases (and claimed as a liberty warranting procedure in 
Connecticut) is the liberty of reputation, delimited by the “stigma plus” test.144  
However, there are two seriously debilitating problems with pushing “stigma 
plus” as a violation of liberty interests.  First, the stigmatizing information that 
triggers substantive due process protection by precedent affects the status or 
rights of the complainant.145  There is nothing technically incorrect or status-
 
 139. Id. at 103; Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 4 (2003). 
 140. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986). 
 141. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). 
 142. Id.; See generally Tribe, supra note 4, but cf. sources cited supra note 5.  In particular, see 
Franke, supra note 5, at 1403-04 (arguing that the liberty in Lawrence is actually a winnowing 
departure from more relational, less territorialized understandings of protected liberty as developed 
in Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe).  See infra note 163. 
 143. See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 9-10 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring). 
 144. See sources cited supra notes 78-80. 
 145. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708-09 (1976). 
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changing in the legal fact that sex offenders are sex offenders.  Second, the 
“plus”—loss of status or rights—must be a direct effect of government action.146  
All the state agencies do is register offenders and put their names online.  
Neither Alaska nor Connecticut burn down sex offenders’ houses or terminate 
their employment—neighbors and employers do, so these are indirect 
consequences.  Substantive due process claims, particularly in the realm of 
reputation, are shaky.  Nonetheless, substantive cases materialized after Smith 
and Connecticut, and explicating the judicial reasoning and non-reasoning is 
instructive. 
Doe v. Tandeske147 rehears the case reversed by Smith.  This is the same court 
(Ninth Circuit) that originally held Alaska’s registration and notification 
requirements in violation of Ex Post Facto protections; now the court entertains 
the Does’ procedural and substantive due process claims.  Connecticut governs 
the procedural claim.148  As Alaska’s registration and notification is also based 
on conviction status, not dangerousness, no hearing on dangerousness is 
necessary.149  On the question of fundamental liberty and substantive due 
process, the circuit judges mention neither Lawrence and its capacious 
understanding of protected liberties nor the concurring opinions in Connecticut 
suggesting that substantive due process may be a viable road for the Does.150  
Instead, the court quickly cites the stricter, enumerated liberty standards of 
Washington v. Glucksberg,151 and writes that it is “bound by controlling Supreme 
Court law,” notwithstanding that Connecticut avowedly did not entertain 
substantive claims.152  And here is the punch line: The Does argued that their 
“fundamental interests in life, liberty, and . . . property” are unconstitutionally 
infringed by Alaska’s sex offender laws.153  The circuit court is “forced to 
conclude” that “persons who have been convicted of serious sex offenses do not 
have a fundamental right to be free from the registration and notification 
requirements set forth in the Alaska statute.”154  Michael Hardwick asked for 
privacy and was told he had no right to gay sodomy.  John Doe asked for rights 
to life, property, and liberty, and was told he had no right not to have his name 
on a sex offender list.  So too, this court, like the Connecticut Court, refuses to 
disambiguate the legal designation “sex offender” and the many nonviolent, 
non-recidivist crimes that fall under its purview.  Doe v. Moore and United States 
of America v. Madera pull the Bowers flip too.155  In Moore, appellants argued that 
Florida’s sex offender scheme violated their rights, inter alia, to “family 
association, to be free of threats to their persons and members of their 
 
 146. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1991). 
 147. 361 F.3d. 594 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 148. Id. at 596. 
 149. Id. at 597. 
 150. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 9-10 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring). 
 151. 521 U.S. 702 (1997); see infra note 163. 
 152. Tandeske, 361 F.3d at 596. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 597. 
 155. Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Madera, 474 F. Supp.2d 1257 
(M.D. Fla. 2007). 
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immediate families . . . to find and/or keep any housing . . . .”156  The district 
court unsurprisingly finds that there is no fundamental right “of a person 
convicted of ‘sexual offenses’ to refuse subsequent registration of his or her 
personal information with Florida law enforcement and prevent publication of 
this information on Florida’s Sexual Offender/Predator website.”157  Like 
Tandeske, the Moore court cites Glucksberg, and similar Supreme Court cases with 
restrictive interpretations of due process.158  There is no mention of Griswold, 
Roe, Eisenstadt, Casey, Lawrence, or the concurring opinions in Connecticut 
intimating the possibility of a substantive due process claim.159  Finally, the 
opinion explicitly insists that it will dismiss the Doe’s capacious liberty claims in 
exchange for their own understanding of the Does’ grievance, a claimed 
fundamental liberty to be removed from a sex offender list.160  The judges of 
Madera rehearse the move too, citing Tandeske.161 
Obviously, appellants overstate the substantive interests to make them 
sound fundamental.  So too, because of the reasons mentioned above—the 
indirect effects of the requirements, the “truth” of the stigmatizing facts (sex 
offenders are legally so, despite their individual crimes, recidivism rates, etc.)—
substantive liberty claims are weak.  Nonetheless, the juridical reductionist 
maneuver, collapsing a big liberty to a tiny risible one, allows the court neither 
to seriously engage appellants’ arguments, nor to substantively canvass the 
physical, economic, and psychic harms incurred by these individuals, nor 
ultimately, to perceive them as individuals at all.162  It’s all just about a name on 
 
 156. Moore, 410 F.3d at 1343. 
 157. Id. at 1344. 
 158. Id. at 1343; Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 
319, 325-26 (1937) (finding that only those rights “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” by 
which “neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed “are fundamental and thus 
sheltered under substantive due process protection).  See infra note 163. 
 159. See infra note 163. 
 160. Moore, 410 F.3d at 1343-44 (“Despite Appellants’ broad framing of their rights in this case, 
however, we must endeavor to create a more careful description of the asserted right in order to 
analyze its importance.  . . . [T]he right at issue here is the right of a person, convicted of ‘sexual 
offenses,’ to refuse subsequent registration of his or her personal information with Florida law 
enforcement and prevent publication of this information on Florida's Sexual Offender/Predator 
website.”). 
 161. United States v. Madera, 474 F.Supp.2d 1257, 1264-65 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (“Keeping in line with 
the Eleventh Circuit as well as her sister Circuits, this Court finds that the Act in question does not 
violate substantive due process because it does not infringe upon any fundamental right.”). Unlike 
the Tandeske and Moore courts, the district court did not canvass the defendant’s particular 
substantive liberty claims to reconfigure them, but omitted them from the opinion altogether.  The 
district court ruling was subsequently reversed in United States v. Madera, 528 F.3d 852 (11th Cir. 
2008) (finding that the retroactive application of the Adam Walsh Act had not been clearly specified 
at the time of Madera’s conviction). 
 162. As Marybeth Herald observes, “whether an activity ‘wins’ fundamental right status often 
seems to depend on how broadly or narrowly the courts frame the question before them.  . . . 
Framing the question in a particular way provides an easy way to influence the outcome.  Asking 
the question at a very specific level is not only a way to constrict the doctrine [of substantive due 
process], but to shut it down if that outcome is preferred.” Herald, supra note 15, at 9, 11.  Herald 
notices this judicial practice (“straw liberties,” as I have called it) in her research on substantive due 
process challenges to state laws banning sex aids: “Does the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment guarantee a citizen the right to stimulate his, her or another’s genitals with an object 
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a list.  Or it’s all just about gay sodomitical acts.  The collapsing act sidesteps 
entirely the longstanding debate among both jurists and legal theorists about the 
scope and application of substantive due process, thereby sidestepping too the 
constitutional interpretations that underwrite the debate.163 
PART IV: SEX OFFENDERS IN THE JUDICIAL IMAGINARY OR WHY THE COURT DOES 
THINGS WITH SEX OFFENDERS 
An insufficiently reductive distillation of the thesis of this article might be: 
the sex offender is the new homosexual.  He or It is the newly minoritized 
Other, a new outcast, a cultural mirage on whom to superordinate normative 
 
designed or marketed primarily for that purpose?” Herald, supra note 15, at 10 (citing Yorko v. State 
690 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). 
 163. Laurence Tribe identifies an ideological split over the nature and purview of substantive 
due process in the course of Court history since the Lochner era (although he argues the split is 
conceptually nonsensical and he favors the more expansive reading of liberty protections).  Laurence 
H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1070-71 
(1980)(“If process is constitutionally valued, therefore, it must be valued not only as a means to some 
independent end, but for its intrinsic characteristics: being heard is part of what it means to be a 
person.  Process itself, therefore, becomes substantive.”). On the traditionalist side of the bench, 
substantive protections are strictly limited to state infringements against liberties that are “deeply 
rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition.”  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).  
Substantive due process, on this reading, covers a set of enumerated liberties, like freedom of 
expression or choices regarding family upbringing, and no more.  See Palko v. Connecticut 302 U.S. 
319, 324-25 (1937).  On the more progressive side of the bench, substantive protections cover not 
enumerated liberties, specific individual acts and phenomena, but rather shield expressive and 
intimate forms of association—and autonomy in determining and partaking in those associations—
from government infringement.  The case history supporting this reading runs from Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a state statute prohibiting contraceptive use among 
married couples infringed the right to privacy), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending 
Griswold’s protections to individuals), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that a right to 
privacy encompasses a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy), and Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (confirming but constricting Roe; however—and crucial to Lawrence 
and the due process debate—“at the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of 
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”), to Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1997) (protecting family arrangements outside marriage from government 
housing discrimination), and finally to Lawrence. 
Among legal scholars, the debate has centered on whether the judicial branch—as opposed to the 
legislative or executive—should ensure any protections to individuals besides proceduralist ones, 
and if so, on what moral and/or constitutional grounds.  See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY 
AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES (2006); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Due Process Traditionalism, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1543 (2008); Tribe, The Puzzling 
Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980); Tribe, supra note 4, at 1922-
31.  Ely favors a narrow proceduralist interpretation of due process protection while Tribe argues 
that a position such as Ely’s is immanently contradictory—a defense of procedure at root 
presupposes a belief in a substantive right to procedure. 
I recount these ideological, interpretive disputes as a counterpoint to my suggestion above that the 
Does’ claims to substantive liberty protections are weak; they are, but one could interpret both the 
Does’ claims (as claims for privacy or rights to self-determination, say, instead of claims to be taken 
off a sex offender web site) and also due process case law (as more capacious, covering relational 
and intimate association, rather than as restricted to foundational, predetermined sets of practices) in 
such a way that grants more credibility to the petitioners.  As the Does’ liberty claims are rhetorically 
restructured in Tandeske, Madera, and Moore (see sources cited supra notes 148-62, and accompanying 
text) such claims cannot enter these debates, let alone win them. 
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sexuality, to displace perversity outside ourselves, to localize, personalize, and 
smooth out deep structural injustices: family incest, the pedophilia of capitalistic 
everyday life, the coerciveness of everyday heterosexuality.164 
This does not capture the complete story, but it certainly captures a chunk 
of it.  Yet it leaves unanswered still a host of questions: What makes, and makes 
efficacious, the rhetorical strategies employed by state legislatures165 and the 
Court to pin the sex offender where he is: the recidivist, the gravest threat, the 
primary and summary figure of the perverse, the dangerous, and the sexually 
harmful?  If “recidivism” is overly prescribed at best and just wrong at worst, 
why do legislators and Justices endlessly invoke its truth to enact or secure these 
laws?  What motivates the Court to conflate and thus officially equate 
dangerous acts with legal identities, taking the acts to be inevitable and the 
identities to be prediscursive?  Why are the rights claims to substantive liberty 
miniaturized to a seemingly silly request to get one’s name off a list?  Objectors 
to sex offender laws have not answered these sorts of questions.  Cultural 
criticism and left-leaning law journal articles uncritically assume it is either 
public anxiety that propels and maintains these laws and/or a fantasy of 
security that shields us from the main perpetrators of sexual abuse: family and 
family acquaintances.166  But the laws are nonetheless rationalized as good, just, 
and constitutional, and fear is too blunt an emotion to do all that complicated 
justificatory work.  The problem, or blind spot, of left legal critique that calls for 
better actuarial models of registration and notification and demands more 
measured attention to dangerousness167 is that it accepts the juridical 
construction of the sex offender as such, as an organizing and disavowing figure 
for understandings of harm and sexual normalcy.  The sex offender productively 
 
 164. See sources cited supra note 12; Richard Mohr, The Pedophilia of Everyday Life, in CURIOUSER, 
supra note 14, at 17.  Mohr makes an evident but overlooked point that current social hysteria around 
pedophilia is matched by an endless eroticization of, and voyeuristic fascination with, children and 
teenagers in advertisements, film, and news media. 
 165. Mona Lynch examines congressional records of four 1990s sex offender legislative bills, and 
documents the language of pollution, contagion, and purity-violation that infuses the discussions.  
Lynch argues that the visceral emotionality of these debates overrides constitutional caution and 
empirical investigation and silences opposition to sex offender notification and registration laws.  See 
generally Mona Lynch, Pedophiles and Cyber-predators as Contaminating Forces: The Language of Disgust, 
Pollution, and Boundary Invasions in Federal Debates on Sex Offender Legislation, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
529 (2002).  Daniel Filler also investigates the rhetoric of legislative debate on Megan’s Law in the 
U.S. Congress and the New York state legislature, evidencing the use of graphic anecdotes of child 
victimization, (often misinformed or misrepresented) statistical claims, and demonic 
characterizations of offenders.  See generally Daniel M. Filler, Making the Case for Megan’s Law: A Study 
in Legislative Rhetoric, 76 IND. L.J. 315 (2001). 
 166. See generally Linda Gordon, The Politics of Child Sexual Abuse: Notes from American History, 28 
FEMINIST REV. 56 (1988); sources cited supra note 18; HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 17. 
 167. See sources cited supra note 18.  Cf. Janus, supra note 17, at 103-04 (“As constructed by the 
predator laws, risk tells us something essential—rather than accidental—about the person. This 
characteristic—sometimes called ‘dangerousness’—is portrayed as a stable ingredient of the person, 
a part of him even if it is now not visible.”). Rose Corrigan objects to left assessments of sex offender 
laws for similar but separate reasons. Although many have drawn attention to the laws’ punitive 
excessiveness and their potential violations of civil liberties, critics have not carefully considered 
how the sex offender laws, through their selective enforcement, categorical exceptions, and symbolic 
configuration regress to an individualistic and antifeminist portrayal of sexual violence. See 
Corrigan, supra note 17, at 276, 280, 288, 291-92, 297. 
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blocks critical thinking about sex and harm.  This article hypothesizes that what 
mechanizes these laws and their judicial defenses is an absence of measured 
theorizing on harm, sex and power, an absence that has become a crisis as the 
homosexual is no longer fair game for subordination and projection, an absence that is 
then filled in by moralized and fictive certainties and reliably predictable tropes.  These 
certainties and tropes provide not, or not only, a false sense of security, but a 
false sense of knowing, by locating harm and danger onto discrete bodies and 
stories.168  The sex offender is not only a scapegoat but also a palliative, a way to 
literalize simple understandings of sexual harm and freedom that do not 
describe the world we live in, but that nevertheless make the world inhabitable 
for us.  The rhetorical strategies of legislatures and then courts might be 
perceived as efforts to manage harm and danger by a steadfast refusal to think 
about them.  Rather than consider the distribution of sexually harmful acts 
across populations, the law has fictively consolidated that harm into a 
subpopulation.  For various historical and political reasons, we can assuredly 
say that John Lawrence is a homosexual, that there are homosexuals.  But is John 
Doe a sex offender, or did we make him one?  Does the law equate a particularly 
disturbing act with an even more disturbing identity to re-organize the world of 
good sex and bad sex, harmful sex and sexual freedom, when the homosexual is 
a now-untenable foil against the protected and potentially procreative 
heterosexuals of Griswold, Eisenstadt, Casey, and Roe?169 
Let us momentarily return to the rhetoric of Lawrence to clarify this 
argument and its stakes.  Justice Kennedy continually presses that the Lawrence 
claimants are consenting adults, and that their consenting adultness portends 
any legal interferences as morally motivated, and not motivated to prevent 
harm.  Kennedy writes, “The present case does not involve minors . . . persons 
who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where 
consent might not be easily refused . . . or public conduct or prostitution.”170 
A new boundary, or a new emphasis on an old boundary, gets its 
architecture in Lawrence, an architecture that reflects the changing national 
temperament.  The hetero/homo divide in sexual morality is unworkable, 
archaic, and now defunct.171  Kennedy’s homosexuals are loving people who 
make intimate, transcendent decisions—they are not gay sodomizers.172  What 
takes its place is the divide between consent and nonconsent.  Consent is 
certainly a phenomenally better metric of sexual harm than gender of object 
choice, but this is not my point.  Rather, as claimed at the outset of Part III, the 
morality question is subsumed under the consent question, where everyone 
classified as a sex offender has presumably violated consent—whether against 
the incapable child, the unwilling woman—and this is morally wrong.  
 
 168. On the “will to know” the criminal and to partition criminal and normal behavior, see 
BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN 
ACTUARIAL AGE 173-92 (2007). 
 169. See supra note 165. 
 170. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 171. See generally Susan Burgess, Queer (Theory) Eye for the Straight (Legal) Guy: Lawrence v. Texas' 
Makeover of Bowers v. Hardwick, 59 POL. RES. Q. 401 (2006). 
 172. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562 (“The instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial 
and more transcendent dimensions.”). 
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However, whether such acts are wrong, and whether rectifying those wrongs is 
best addressed by overreaching sex offender notification and registration 
requirements, are separate questions, but they are mashed together as the same.  
In the language of Smith and Connecticut these latter questions get coded as 
questions of harm prevention, not morality enforcement, and because they are 
coded as such they find constitutional shelter.173  Meanwhile the set of 
proscribed acts where the application of consent seems relatively irrelevant—
prostitution,174 public urination—remain forms of behavior socially and 
juridically unacceptable, forms not as beautiful or mysterious as Kennedy’s 
homosexual identity.175  However, these acts too are drafted as harmful and 
perpetually dangerous under Alaska’s 1994 statute, and now under the 2006 
Adam Walsh Act, and can be regulated accordingly, post—and yet regardless 
of, or maybe because of—the robust liberties discovered in Lawrence in 2003.176 
In Lawrence, for a case not about morality, morality is referred to all the 
time as the abstraction the Court shall not evaluate nor regulate.  Kennedy 
presses the morality/harm distinction, insisting the law has no place in moral 
redress.177  He cites the famous passage of Casey: our “obligation is to define the 
liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”178  Like John Stuart Mill, 
Justice Kennedy insists on driving a wedge between morality and (other-
regarding) harm, and bracketing morality from legal interference.179  Like Mill, 
Kennedy’s distinction must fail, as Justice Scalia bitingly reminds us.  A law 
prohibiting harm reflects a moral investment.  As Scalia notes, laws against 
bigamy, polygamy, and prostitution are morally motivated.180  Distinctions 
between self-regarding harm, other-regarding harm, and offense are always 
shifty.  But unlike Mill, Kennedy has no consciousness of the division’s inherent 
instability, its slipperiness; there is no humbled latitude that leaves open the 
harm/morality classification to future interpretation.181  It is this absolute 
emphasis on a bright line where none exists that comes to be injuriously 
moralistic, that re-divides sexual lives and acts between right and wrong, that 
overextends the law and over-penalizes its infractions.  More, it is the very 
 
 173. See generally Harcourt, supra note 15. 
 174. I am not ignoring the considerable feminist literature challenging the validity of consent 
under the structural and economic constraints of prostitution.  Rather, I am suggesting that by 
positioning the consenting adult as the bearer of constitutional privilege and protection against those 
cases involving minors, prostitution, and sex offenses, Lawrence presumes the nonconsensuality and 
harmful effects of these latter cases by assertion instead of argument. 
 175. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey 505 U. S. 833, 851 (1992)); see 
supra note 165. 
 176. See Tribe, supra note 4. 
 177. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571. 
 178. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey 505 U.S. 
833, 850 (1992)). 
 179. See generally J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 5-128 (John Gray ed., Oxford Univ., 2d. 
ed.,1998) (1859). 
 180. See supra note 15. 
 181. See MILL, supra note 179, 83-93; Harcourt, supra note 15, at 121.  Perhaps Mill is not 
completely cognizant of the slipperiness of his categories, but over the course of ON LIBERTY, what 
counts as harmful action which requires legal intervention comes to look less like an objective and 
ontological matter and more like a societal determination. 
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expansion of liberty Kennedy extends to homosexual identities, to consenting 
adults, that, in good binary form, in the hope of preserving a social order that is 
always already ruined, requires curtailing liberties elsewhere, in a newly re-
publicized sexual minority, the sex offender.  Might it be the case that the 
‘nameless,’ multidimensional character of the substantive liberty in Lawrence is 
terrifyingly open-ended, that left agreement in principle is cushioned in practice 
by redrawing lines that are named and naturalized?182  Is the promise of robust 
substantive liberty also an abyss, patched over by the uncomfortable comfort of 
online sex offender registries—in which one finds, on one website, in one place, 
exhaustively, sex harm?  Since offenders are perceived as uniformly harming, 
liberty curtailment here looks not like mandating a moral code, but doing the 
right thing.183  Justice Kennedy is right that Lawrence is not about minors, 
prostitution, or coerced adults, but rather than considering the ethical and legal 
questions presented by intergenerational sex, sex for money, and differing forms 
of force in everyday sexual interaction, Lawrence—combined with Smith and 
Connecticut—casts homosexuals on the good side of sexuality and sexual 
morality, and casts the others, unilaterally, as sex offenders. 
In The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, Katherine Franke makes an 
argument orthogonal to mine.184  It is the limitedness, she argues, of the liberty 
protections in Lawrence afforded to consensual adults in private that depresses 
its utility for progressive sexual politics.185  She notes that after Lawrence, the 
Kansas Court of Appeals upheld a law mandating longer prison sentences for 
homosexual sex with a minor than for heterosexual sex with a minor.186  
(Eighteen year-old Matthew Limon was given a seventeen year sentence for 
having oral sex with a fourteen year-old.)  The court held that Lawrence liberty 
protections did not apply to differential sentencing based on sex, because the 
Kansas law was not concerned with consenting adults.  Franke writes that this 
ruling evidences that Lawrence “offers little . . . to those who seek to engage in 
non-normative heterosexual behavior.”187  But it is not that Lawrence does not 
extend its reach to Matthew Limon so much as Lawrence in some sense portends 
his imprisonment, that it organizes and understands sexual harm such that the 
person who crosses the boundary of legally-defined consent, who crosses the 
boundary of legally-defined ages of majority and minority, is the anti-John 
 
 182. See Tribe, supra note 4. 
 183. Rather than conceive Bowers in terms of judicial restraint as a “romantic stabilization” 
narrative of the foregone past, or Lawrence in terms of judicial activism as a “comedic liberation” 
narrative of a promising future, Susan Burgess ironizes the judicial trajectory from 1986 to 2003.  
Burgess suggests that Lawrence is a kind of queer makeover of Bowers, in which the Justices grew 
savvier, more cosmopolitan, indeed more queer in their appreciation of gay relations.  See Burgess, 
supra note 172.  I find her reading persuasive, and yet I think Smith and Connecticut are stuck in the 
genre of gothic, of Manichean morality and justice that subtends the Justices’ moments of queer 
irony.  See KINCAID, supra note 14, at 30. The risk of fluid cosmopolitan sensibilities is acquiesced by 
the rigid installment of a gothic—which is to say fictional—villain. 
 184. See Franke, supra note 5. 
 185. Id. at 1412-13. 
 186. Id. at 1411-12; State v. Limon, 32 Kan. App.2d 369, 383-84 (2004), subsequently reversed in 
State v. Limon, 280 Kan. 275 (2005) (but holding that the law violated equal protection guarantees, 
not due process). 
 187. Franke, supra note 5, at 1413. 
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Lawrence; he makes not intimate decisions but recidivates impulsively, his 
liberty is not to be contained in the domestic but constricted through public 
notification.  There are no gradations between Smith and Connecticut on the one 
hand and Lawrence on the other: either one is a consenting adult having sex in 
private, whose sex is good and free, or one is a sex offender, whose sex is 
harmful.  Put differently, Franke’s concern is that the Kansas law punished gay 
teenagers for having sex more harshly than it did straight teenagers, and 
Lawrence has nothing to say about this.  My concern is that this law punished 
teenagers for having sex, and Lawrence has everything to say about this. 
Indeed, how else should we make sense of Kennedy’s reference to Smith 
and Connecticut in the Lawrence decision itself?  He writes, “the stigma this 
criminal statute imposes . . . is not trivial. . . . [I]t remains a criminal offense with 
all that imports for the dignity of the persons charged . . . .”188  Justice Kennedy, 
referencing the Smith decision of three months prior, admonishes that were 
sodomy statutes permitted, Lawrence would “come within the registration laws 
of at least four States.”189  Remarkably, he writes, “this underscores the 
consequential nature of the punishment and the state-sponsored condemnation 
attendant to the criminal prohibition.”190 
For homosexuals then, sex offender laws do amount to state condemnation, 
impose serious stigma, and undermine human dignity.  The laws do all the sorts 
of things against homosexuals that they apparently do not do to other sex 
offenders, from prostitutes, to sexually active teenagers, to people who have 
committed violent sexual acts.  This is because, for Kennedy, homosexuals are 
people.  Sex offenders are not.191  Less dramatically, homosexuals are identities 
that now fall under the apparently de-moralized (but not demoralized) ambit of 
 
 188. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 576 (emphasis added).  See also Case, supra note 5, at 121 (“[A] substantial driving force 
for the result in Lawrence may be that the majority and concurring Justices see people like Lawrence 
and Garner . . . as precisely not the sort of people who should be spending the night in jail, or 
registering as sex offenders . . . .”).  But who are these “sort of people”?  Does one become a sex 
offender, a persona, in the act of registering as one?  Is it possible that not only are Lawrence and 
Garner not sex offenders, but at the very moment a particular form of sexual privacy is secured and 
codified, there is a concomitant codification of intensified publicizing of sexual deviance and crime, in 
the name of security?  It is as if, now that we can neither know nor regulate what gay people do in 
their homes, we must know what happens outside, and knowing feels like doing something, or 
preventing something, even if the “what” we know (sex offenders are in our neighborhood) has no 
correlation to the “who” (the practices and variations of, as well as the regulatory effects of the laws 
on, “sex offenders”). 
 191. Between earlier gay rights cases and Lawrence, notes Mary Ann Case, “It appears Kennedy 
has . . . come to understand that the law is implicated in creating stigma, rather than stigma being 
just a social fact unrelated to the law.”  See Case, supra note 5, at 106.  I would qualify that Kennedy’s 
revelation of law’s constitutive functions stops dead at the homosexual, and plays no parallel role for 
sex offenders.  According to Eric Janus, “After the Supreme Court’s Lawrence decision declared that 
homosexuality may not be used as a degraded status, we might have been tempted to pronounce 
American outsider jurisprudence all but dead.  . . . But there is evidence that the existence of the 
degraded other has not been a horrible historical diversion but is rather a central—though tragic—
addiction of our liberal democracy.”  JANUS, supra note 17, at 105-06.  By “outsider jurisprudence,” 
Janus refers to the legal discrimination of subject populations deemed threatening to the social order. 
My argument is that Lawrence, rather than being a leaky stopgap to outsider jurisprudence, in fact 
continues its logic. 
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consenting adults, with all the constitutional protection that (now) entails.  The 
homosexual, though, is the limit case, and the sex offender takes up the vacated 
space, complicated of course, and also exacerbated, by the fact that subsets of 
those designated sex offenders do commit crimes that are indeed harmful. 
How then might we conceptualize the rhetoric of recidivism?  What is so 
interesting about claims to recidivism is not that they are factually suspect, but 
that they propel legislation192 and judicial affirmation despite their factual faults.  
One recalls David Halperin’s astute observation that homophobia is not 
countered merely by proving homophobic stereotypes false.  Homophobia is 
powerful precisely because it operates over facts, or makes up new ones.193  
Recidivism, like escalating danger, like homophobia, is a trope, a discourse.  It 
allows us to manage harm, identify sexual deviance, and neatly trace harm to 
sexual deviance.194  The very image of recidivism, of criminal conduct occurring 
and recurring, of ultimate and unrelenting sexually abhorrent behavior, of 
violence without a responsible agent behind the violence, is a marvel of a 
condensation point.  The magnitude and uncontrollability of sexual 
dangerousness purportedly endemic to the recidivist reassures that the 
recidivist embodies sexual harm itself, is its exclusive, endlessly absorbing 
repository. 
Responding to the concern that the Connecticut scheme does not 
adequately assess dangerousness,195 the state’s Attorney General, Richard 
Blumenthal, quipped, “In fact, we disclaim any assessment of individual 
dangerousness. . . . The reason every individual is on the registry is because he 
has been convicted of a sex offense, which unfortunately has an exceptionally 
high rate of recidivism.”196  Condensed in this quotation are both the 
irresolvable paradox at the root of the sex offender court cases (and the 
legislation), as well as an explanation for the persistent power the paradox 
holds.  Dangerousness in this context can mean nothing other than the 
likelihood of re-offense, and in one impressive move, the state attorney general 
posits that the state is both uninterested in convicted sex offenders’ 
dangerousness and that their alleged dangerousness motivates the statutory 
scheme.  In effect, Blumenthal, like the Rehnquist opinion197 and the Scalia 
concurrence,198 declares the convicts dangerous—they are dangerous because the 
law and the state says so, not because their dangerousness has been evaluated—
 
 192. See supra note 166. 
 193. See DAVID M. HALPERIN, SAINT FOUCAULT: TOWARDS A GAY HAGIOGRAPHY 37-38 (1995). 
 194. On the emergence of the pathological recidivist in criminology and theories of punishment 
see MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 100 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d. ed. 1995) 
(1977) (“Now through the repetition of the crime, what one was aiming at was not the author of an 
act defined by law, but the delinquent subject himself, a certain will that manifested his intrinsically 
criminal character.  Gradually, as criminality, rather than crime, became the object of penal 
intervention, the opposition between first offender and recidivist tended to become more 
important.”). 
 195. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 116-17 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 196. Jane Gordon, Ruling Opens Door to List Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003, at 14CN6 
(emphasis added). 
 197. See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 3-9 (2003). 
 198. See id. at 9-10 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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so offenders’ claims to the contrary are preemptively neutralized by sovereign 
authority.  The maneuver works, I have been arguing, because there is already 
an operative preconception of what a sex offender is and does, his presumptive 
pathological recidivism, that makes him into a kind of comprehensive yet 
always combustible container of sexual danger.  So too, the very language of 
recidivism, a language that trades in probabilities, social science, and actuarial 
models, a language that seems objective, neutral, and dispassionate, perhaps 
masks the kinds of cultural anxieties and juridical codification of those anxieties 
that create the monolithic199 figure of the sex offender as we know him. 
How might we conceptualize the shuttling between acts and identities?  
Janet Halley argues that the Bowers Court shuttled between acts rhetoric and 
identity rhetoric to superordinate heterosexuality, subordinate homosexuality, 
and ultimately to conceal the (sodomitical) sex of heterosexuality, to conceal 
heterosexuality as a social marker, because power resides in invisibility, in not 
being marked.200  I do not think that Smith and Connecticut relay between 
dangerous acts and punished identities simply to overlook or obscure everyday 
forms of sexual violence, or shield heterosexual relations from juridical or 
critical scrutiny.  I do think the rhetorical relay is an additional strategy to isolate 
sex harm, and to remoralize sex in a more gay-friendly nation and a more gay-
friendly Court. 
A 2004 Harvard Law Review Note, criticizing sex offender laws on the 
dangerousness/punishment disjuncture, argues that the government “cannot 
have its cake and eat it too.”201  However the dangerousness/punishment 
contradiction, like its act/identity predecessor, is performative, it does 
something, and it is exactly why the government can have and eat its sex 
offenders.202  By relaying between the two judicial postures, by inhabiting 
neither and both, the Court imagines harm and danger on the same body, it 
requires that harm and dangerousness be ambiguated, and warns that 
disambiguating them is to invite harm and danger rather than, say, to engage 
critically and carefully.  The sex offender in the judicial imaginary discourages 
thinking about sex harm because we already know it when we see it, and seeing 
otherwise, seeing shades of gray or ambiguity, is moral laxity.  And seeing 
otherwise is nipped before it begins by traversing between the offender as 
uniformly perverse and punishable (identity) and the offender as uniformly 
dangerous (future, inevitable acts).  It is all in one place and on one person. 
Perhaps more invidiously, the response of dangerousness to the claim of 
punishment grants a liberally neutral or actuarial mask to a court that vilifies 
offenders when they request risk assessment.  I am thinking here too of the 
Adam Walsh Act tier system.203  Its division of sex offenders according to 
 
 199. I should note that in both popular and scholarly discourse, the figure of the sex offender is 
not in fact monolithic, and there has been increasingly vocal concern about young and nonviolent 
persons designated sex offenders by the state.  See supra notes 18, 46-51.  Nevertheless, Smith, 
Connecticut, and the Adam Walsh Act suppress the disagreement where it matters most—the law—
as far as the offender is concerned. 
 200. See Halley, supra note 126, at 1770. 
 201. See Note, Making Outcasts Out of Outlaws, supra note 18, at 2732. 
 202. See supra note 87. 
 203. See supra notes 38-48, and accompanying text. 
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severity into three tiers seems facially actuarial, neoliberal, and softly 
biopolitical;204 but the gratuitously wide cast of those tiers with few distinctions 
for violence, few distinctions for age, automatic valuing “up” of any sex 
involved with a minor, and the extended duration of registration and 
notification, suggest that the punitive violence of AWA, as well as the 
Connecticut and Alaska statutes, are covered by a façade of probability talk.205 
How might we conceptualize the miniaturizing of the liberty claims to 
privacy, familial association, and employment, as well as the liberty claims to 
avoid the “stigma plus” damages of registration and notification, the violent 
threats and acts against offenders’ homes and bodies?  For Justice White, turning 
the homosexual into a sex act purposefully devalued the homosexual.  When the 
lower courts entertain substantive liberty claims, their rejections often start in 
some form of the question: “Does the sex offender have a right to remove his 
name from the sex offender list?”206  It is not the human John Doe the Court 
considers, already a pseudonym to avoid the shame of public record, but the sex 
offender sex offending and sex reoffending, the presumption of recidivism 
tautologically built into the structural logic of the question.  John Does are 
reduced to a personage, a personage automatically betraying a past and 
inevitable future of dangerous acts, a personage that is not a person, but a 
pathology.207 
We want there to be an Iago, a Voldemort, a Hannibal Lecter, particularly 
in a judicial era and a national climate marked by new acceptances of sexual life 
forms and identities, in which consent does double duty as our metric of 
morality and our metric of harm.  No doubt, there are some pathologically 
abusive, harmful people who do very bad things.  No doubt, consent is the 
necessary starting point for legal adjudication in the liberal state.  But it is just 
the starting point, and a more robust and attuned judicial and social vocabulary 
is required to address the array of sexually unjust and harmful practices that 
does not collapse into adjudicating, with wrongheaded certainty, between the 
 
 204. The argument is influenced by MICHEL FOUCAULT, “SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED”: LECTURES 
AT THE COLLEGE DE FRANCE, 1975-76 (Mauro Bertani & Alessandro Fontana eds., David Macey trans., 
Picador 2003) (1997) and HARCOURT, supra note 168.  A tiered system of sex offender notification and 
registration purports to gauge the probability of reoffense (actuarial) and to relieve government 
agencies of invasive regulatory and rehabilitative techniques in favor of a seemingly more hands-off 
monitoring and deterrent approach (neoliberal); it also aims in its manifest purpose at preserving 
public health and safety rather than corporally or capitally punishing individuals (biopolitical).  
These advantages may work to obscure the singling out of sex offenders for this kind of regulation, 
the breadth of the regulation, and its psychic and physical consequences for offenders.  The Adam 
Walsh Act, and notification and registration more broadly, functionally make recidivism itself a 
crime.  By targeting recidivists and recidivism, these schemes may distract attention from sexual 
harm in the larger population, and may also contribute to an exaggerated correlation of recidivism 
to sex crimes.  For a broader critique of actuarial models of crime prediction and punishment, see 
HARCOURT, supra note 168, at 3, 24, 29, 31, 164-65, 189-90; Janus also suggests that the legal focus on 
sex offender commitment reflects and authorizes the state’s turn to preventing crimes yet to have 
happened over punishing crimes that have already occurred. The emphasis on prevention enables 
broader police and surveillance powers, most recently borne by terrorist suspects. See JANUS, supra 
note 17, at 93-109. 
 205. See supra note 40-44. 
 206. See supra notes 147-63. 
 207. See FOUCAULT, supra note 19; FOUCAULT, supra note 194. 
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normal everyday sexually ethical citizen and the unstoppably evil predator, 
between the transcendent and free homosexual and the dangerous sex offender.  
Evil is only anthropomorphized in the gothic, and the gothic is a genre, not a 
lived reality.208  The gothic is an injurious but juridically consolidating and 
socially productive riposte.  And where consent may be legally determinative, it 
masks a pre-Lawrence cultural morality, sublimated but salient, and a cultural 
longing for social and sexual simplicity, for fixed absolutes of right and wrong, 
for righteousness and vengeance, that cannot be disavowed through the 
juridical freedom promised to the post-Lawrence homosexual. 
 
 
 208. See KINCAID, supra note 14, at 30. 
